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"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poli-
tics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein."1 With these words, Jus-
* Director, American Civil Liberties Union Arts Censorship Project; Senior Staff
Counsel, ACLU Legal Department; J.D., Harvard University, 1978; author, SEx, SIN, AND
BLASPHEMY: A GuIDE TO AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS (1993). The author participated
in several of the cases or controversies mentioned in this Article. See infra note 355 (dis-
cussing Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F. Supp. 864 (D. Kan. 1995) and Campbell
v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995)); 221-26 and accompanying text
(discussing Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.N.C. 1993), affd mem., 28 F.
3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994)); 162 (relating an example of viewpoint-driven use of obscenity
laws against the Pink Pyramid bookstore in Cincinnati, Ohio); 184-88 and accompanying
text (discussing Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 55 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995) (certifying
questions to Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court) 423 Mass. 283 (1996)); 133 (discussing
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), probable juris noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 1996); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996));
66, 148, 200, 214 (discussing Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, No. 92-56028,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28837 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996)); 378 (discussing Walker v. Merrimack
Sch. Dist., No. C-96-87-SD (D.N.H., filed Feb. 15, 1996)); text accompanying notes 202-09
(relating the controversy over Fairfax County, Virginia's arts guidelines).
Acknowledgements for helpful suggestions and criticism to Ann Brick, Frank Haiman,
Susan Herman, Carlin Meyer, Robert Post, and David Rudenstine.
Copyright 1996 by Marjorie Heins.
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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tice Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court over fifty years ago in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,2 poignantly stated
a reigning principle of First Amendment jurisprudence. Later
Supreme Court decisions have phrased the idea less metaphorically,
but equally forcefully, in terms condemning government action that
casts a "pall of orthodoxy ' 3 or "'aim[s] at the suppression of danger-
ous ideas."' 4
This constitutional prohibition against "viewpoint discrimina-
tion," and the jurisprudential pursuit of its converse, "viewpoint neu-
trality," arise from the most basic values underlying the First
Amendment. These values include the right to think, believe, and
speak freely, the fostering of intellectual and spiritual growth, and the
free exchange of ideas necessary to a properly functioning democ-
racy.5 Government action that suppresses or burdens speech on the
basis of its viewpoint threatens all of these values by skewing public
debate, retarding democratic change, depriving people of ideas and
artistic experiences that could contribute to their growth, and other-
wise constricting human liberty.6
2. Id.
3. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
4. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,548 (1983) (quoting Camma-
rano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519
(1958)).
5. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN LIBERTY (1989) (positing
that the First Amendment's primary purpose is advancement of human liberty); THOMAS
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970) ("[Free expression] carries
beyond the political realm. It embraces the right to participate in the building of the whole
culture, and includes freedom of expression in religion, literature, art, science, and all of
the areas of human learning and knowledge .... ); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrICAL
FREEDOM (1960); STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND Ro-
MANCE (1990); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-22, at 785-89
(1978) ("[T]he Constitution's most majestic guarantee" (free speech) cannot be under-
stood "in purely instrumental or purposive terms."); Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975); Alexander Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Or. REv. 245; Robert Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1271-72 (1995); Martin Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Peculiar Case
of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 100-04 (1978); Susan H. Williams,
Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 676-94 (1991)
(defining First Amendment values to include pursuit of truth, proper functioning of a de-
mocracy, fulfillment of human potential, self-expression, tolerance, and encouragement of
dissent).
6. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J.,
concurring) ("[Viewpoint-based regulation is] censorship in a most odious form .... );
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1954)
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But if identifying the importance of viewpoint neutrality is rela-
tively easy, it is not always so simple to define exactly what it means or
to specify how it should apply in the myriad contexts in which govern-
ment interacts with its citizens. And the Supreme Court, despite its
inspiring rhetoric on the subject, has not been a model of clarity.
First, the Court's First Amendment decisions have ricocheted be-
tween a focused emphasis on viewpoint discrimination as the ultimate
First Amendment evil, and broader condemnations of "content dis-
crimination."'7 Content is a spacious concept that embraces whole
subjects of discourse regardless of the "viewpoint" expressed.
Although in general, regulations that discriminate on the basis of con-
tent require greater judicial scrutiny than so-called "content-neutral"
regulations that merely control the "time, place, and manner" of
speech,8 the Court has recognized that government edicts based on
the "content" of citizen speech are often permissible. 9
Second, the Court has further confused the matter by sometimes
using the terms "content" and "viewpoint" interchangeably."0 It has
justified this interchangeable use by explaining that prohibitions
against content and viewpoint discrimination flow from the same con-
cern-government attempts to control public debate and suppress dis-
favored ideas." In doing so, however, the Court has failed to
acknowledge that not all content discrimination has these purposes or
effects.
Alternatively, the Court has said that what it really looks for in
content discrimination cases is how close the discrimination involved
comes to being viewpoint-based. 12 This formulation does little to ex-
plain the Court's invalidation of content-based speech regulations
having little or no viewpoint bias, including, for example, the exclu-
(banning film because it advocates unconventional idea "str[ikes] at the very heart of con-
stitutionally protected liberty").
7. See infra Part I.A-B.
8. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989); Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
9. See infra Part I.B; see, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 58-62, 79-85; see, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1989).
11. See infra Part I.A.; see, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383
(1984); Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
12. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
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sion of whole categories of speech from traditional public fora, or bur-
densome regulation of speech by criminals about their crimes. 3
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's linking of "content" and
"viewpoint" has had its positive side. The Court has recognized, for
example, that government discrimination against broad categories of
expression such as "political," "controversial," or "offensive" speech,
is often a guise for disagreement with the ideas expressed, or is so
close in spirit to viewpoint discrimination that the same strict First
Amendment review should apply.'4 Yet the Supreme Court and some
lower courts have often failed to classify burdens imposed on "polit-
ical," "controversial," or "offensive" speech as viewpoint-based, that
is, "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."'1 5 As a result, some
courts have permitted discrimination in the terms of access to certain
government property or benefits-for example, restrictions on art dis-
play space in government buildings, where the space in question was
found by reviewing courts to be appropriately limited to "nonpoliti-
cal," "noncontroversial," or "nonoffensive" speech. 6
By contrast, two recent Supreme Court decisions, Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District7 and Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,'8 established that dis-
crimination against "religious" expression is viewpoint-based, and
therefore invalid. In Rosenberger, the Court explained that public de-
bate is "complex and multi-faceted"" and that discrimination against
13. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82, 90-101, 110-23. As the Court has often
remarked, "political" or "controversial political" speech stands at the "highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982) (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 467); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
115 S.Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); Carey, 447 U.S. at
467; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964).
15. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,548 (1983); see, e.g., Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980) (assuming that
ban on utility bill inserts regarding "controversial issues of public policy" was content- but
not viewpoint-based); see also infra text accompanying notes 81-83,241-57. Cases in which
discrimination against "political" or "controversial" speech has been permitted include Ha-
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); and Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 221-44.
17. 508 U.S. 384 (1993); see infra text accompanying notes 110-11.
18. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995); see infra text accompanying notes 112-19.
19. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
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whole categories of ideas (e.g., religious ones) can "skew" that debate
in "multiple ways."20 This crucial perception applies equally to cate-
gories of ideas labeled by officials as "controversial," "political," or
"offensive." After Rosenberger, discrimination against such "contro-
versial," "political," or "offensive" ideas should be understood as
viewpoint-based.
The Supreme Court also has thus far failed to see discrimination
against sex-related speech as viewpoint-based. In fact, sex-related
speech has generally received even less solicitous treatment than other
"controversial" or "offensive" subjects. Indeed, despite the oft-
trumpeted rule against content discrimination in government regula-
tion of speech, sexually explicit speech that is found to be "offensive"
by some local community, if also deemed to appeal to the "prurient
interest" and to lack "serious value," receives no First Amendment
protection at all and may be prosecuted under obscenity laws.2 ' Yet
the very justification for this "obscenity" exception to the First
Amendment is itself viewpoint-based because it is justified by moral
objections to the ideas or messages that sexual speech is said to
convey.22
The concept of viewpoint neutrality in First Amendment jurispru-
dence has thus been confusing in both definition and application, and
has been selectively applied in many contexts. As a result, courts have
often failed to recognize censorship of dissenting or discomfiting view-
points, and have permitted government to "suppress dangerous ideas"
in precisely the manner most threatening to First Amendment values.
Part I of this Article traces the history and application of the
viewpoint discrimination doctrine, and the simultaneous development
of Supreme Court precedent addressing the broader category of con-
tent discrimination. It also contrasts cases invalidating restrictions on
religious speech as viewpoint-based with others where the Court has
treated restrictions on "political," "controversial," or "offensive"
speech as viewpoint-neutral.
Part II analyzes the particularly hostile way in which speech on
the important subject of human sexuality has been relegated to a
highly diluted form of First Amendment protection. Since Miller v.
20. Id.
21. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); infra Part II.
22. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,58,63 (1973); infra text accompany-
ing notes 140-47.
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California23 was decided in 1973, sexual speech, even if not obscene,
has been subject to a variety of burdensome restrictions. It has also,
ironically, become more fundamentally a part of public discourse. Yet
courts still do not generally understand sexual speech as political, or
its suppression as an impermissible assault on "dangerous" ideas.
Part III reviews and critiques the way in which courts have han-
dled viewpoint discrimination claims in the contexts of public and
nonpublic fora, government subsidies, and other benefits. Here, the
rule of viewpoint neutrality is amply justified by the dangers inherent
in permitting the state to suppress critical and dissenting ideas through
manipulation of its myriad benefit programs. But what of claims that
certain government properties or grant monies are simply inappropri-
ate vehicles for communicating "political," "controversial," or "offen-
sive" (including sexual) points of view? Courts have shown
considerable confusion here, and have sometimes permitted disfa-
vored treatment for the type of expression that most needs constitu-
tional protection.
Part IV evaluates the concept and status of "government speech."
Presumably, a presidential press conference may express the political
viewpoint of the administration in power and exclude all others from
its podium. Does the same apply, however, to artworks owned by the
government, or to government-owned and operated museums, librar-
ies, and broadcast stations? Viewpoint neutrality is not irrelevant in
the realm of "government speech," but plainly the principle should
not apply the same way that it does in situations where the govern-
ment imposes criminal or civil penalties, or facilitates the speech of
citizens.
Part V explores the hybrid sphere of public education, where gov-
ernment interests (such as inculcating "civic values") often clash with
the First Amendment principles of diversity, openness, and intellec-
tual inquiry. The complications wrought in the rule of viewpoint neu-
trality by this tension between the government's power to inculcate
civic values and the constitutional ban on the suppression of disfa-
vored ideas might aptly be called the "Pico paradox," after the
Supreme Court's 1982 attempt to resolve it in the context of public
school libraries.'
. 23. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (rejecting arguments that there is no constitutional basis for an
obscenity exception to the First Amendment).
24. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); infra text accompanying notes
346-62.
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The Article concludes that in all these areas viewpoint neutrality
must remain a critical principle, but that the concept has been defined
too narrowly. To be fully responsive to underlying First Amendment
values,25 viewpoint neutrality must be understood to condemn, at least
presumptively, government actions that discriminate against speech
deemed "political," "controversial," or "offensive," including expres-
sion or information on the subject of sex.
I. The Semantics of Suppression
A. Viewpoint Neutrality
The Supreme Court's special concern for viewpoint neutrality can
be traced at least to Hague v. CIO,2 6 where it struck down an ordi-
nance governing the issuance of permits to speak on public streets.
The Court noted that the broad discretion granted city officials under
the law could, "as the record discloses, be made the instrument of
arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs. ' 27
The Court stated the point more explicitly four years later in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,28 which invalidated a
public school compulsory flag salute because it impermissibly "pre-
scribe[d] what shall be orthodox" in the realm of politics, conscience,
and ideas.29
Even at the height of McCarthyism in the 1950s, when the Court
acquiesced in many executive and legislative initiatives to suppress
speech or punish speakers based on a perceived "subversive" view-
point,30 the Court paid obeisance to the viewpoint neutrality principle
it had announced in Barnette. Thus, although the Court in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds31 upheld the notorious federal law
requiring labor union officers to take a noncommunist oath, it simulta-
neously announced its disapproval of laws "frankly aimed at the sup-
pression of dangerous ideas."32 The majority asserted that the
25. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
26. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
27. Id. at 516.
28. 319 U.S. 624 (1943), rev'g Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
30. See cases cited infra note 47; see, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Lawson &
Trumbo v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
31. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
32. Id. at 402. For its condemnation of laws "aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas," the Court cited its World War I Espionage Act cases, for example, Schenck v.
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noncommunist oath was simply not such a law.33 Justice Jackson, the
author of Bamette, not surprisingly dissented on this point.34
The year after Douds, the Court in Niemotko v. Maryland3 5 re-
versed convictions against Jehovah's Witnesses for disorderly conduct
based on their use of a public park for Bible talks without a permit.
The municipality's permit requirement was unwritten and standar-
dless. Emphasizing, as in Hague, the potential for viewpoint discrimi-
nation inherent in governmental policies so rich in uncabined
discretion, the Court held the city's requirement unconstitutional,36
and noted that the rule against viewpoint discrimination was grounded
in Equal Protection as well as First Amendment principles.37
Douds' condemnation of laws "frankly aimed at the suppression
of dangerous ideas" also drove the result in Speiser v. Randall,38 which
struck down a California law requiring a loyalty oath as a qualifying
condition for a veterans' tax exemption. Building on the pronounce-
ment in Douds that free speech is abridged when government condi-
tions a benefit on the "restraint of [the] exercise" of speech,39 the
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), see Douds, 339 U.S. at 395 n.9, 402 n.16, as well as the
memorable early Holmes and Brandeis opinions asserting that in the First Amendment
"marketplace of ideas," offensive, unpopular, and even subversive viewpoints must be pro-
tected, see id. at 394-95 (citing, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
33. Justice Vinson's opinion for the Court recognized the danger of imposing "uncon-
stitutional conditions" on government benefits (in that case, government recognition of
labor unions and regulation of labor disputes), but disposed of the danger in circular fash-
ion by explaining that the noncommunist oath was not "frankly aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas ... but only against the combinations of those affiliations or beliefs with
occupancy of a position of great power over the economy of the country." Douds, 339 U.S.
at 402-04 (citations and footnotes omitted).
34. See id. at 422, 443. Jackson actually agreed with the majority that the noncom-
munist oath was constitutional, but he objected to the broader requirement of disavowing
any belief in forcible overthrow of the government. He pointed out that the United States
won its freedom in a revolutionary war that was certainly forcible: "The danger that citi-
zens will think wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not thinking at
all.... Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it." Id. at
439-40, 442. Justices Frankfurter and Black also dissented. Id at 415, 445.
35. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
36. See id. at 271-73. Viewpoint discrimination was no mere possibility: the applicants
had been questioned about their "alleged refusal to salute the flag, their views on the
Bible, and other issues irrelevant to unencumbered use of the public parks." Id. at 272.
The Court concluded "that the use of the park was denied because of the City Council's
dislike for or disagreement with the Witnesses or their views." Id.
37. See id. at 272.
38. 357 U.S. 513, 516 (1958).
39. Id. at 519. On the development of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, see,
for example, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional
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Speiser Court said that denying a government benefit like a tax ex-
emption because a citizen engaged in certain speech would "necessar-
ly.., force individuals into political silence," and "is 'frankly aimed
at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 40
Cammarano v. United States4 reiterated Speiser's rule that deny-
ing government benefits to citizens because of their speech amounts
to an "unconstitutional condition." The policy at issue in Camma-
rano, however-disallowance of a business expense tax deduction for
lobbying activities-was not such a condition. The Court determined
that the policy was speaker-based, not viewpoint-based, that is, not
"aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."42 Congress may con-
stitutionally decide not to subsidize whole types of speech like lobby-
ing.43 The Court reiterated this distinction between "unconstitutional
conditions" and legitimate limits on subsidy programs in another chal-
lenge to denial of a tax benefit in Regan v. Taxation with Representa-
tion,' noting that "the case would be different if Congress were to
discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to '[aim] at
the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 45
Unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint discrimination doc-
trine converged again in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 46 Despite
questionable precedents in the 1950s that had permitted punishment
of public employees or licensees because of their political view-
points,4 7 the Court in Keyishian invalidated a New York law that man-
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989); and William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). See infra
text accompanying notes 195-99.
40. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). This viewpoint bias was not enough in itself to invalidate the law in
Speiser, since the California Supreme Court had narrowed it to deny exemptions only to
claimants "who engage in speech which may be criminally punished" under state or federal
antisubversion laws. Id. at 519. The Speiser Court instead invalidated the loyalty oath law
because it lacked adequate procedural safeguards: "Where the transcendent value of
speech is involved, due process certainly requires ... that the State bear the burden of
persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech." Id. at 526.
41. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
42. Id. at 513.
43. See id.
44. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
45. Ld. at 548 (quoting Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519)). The
Court accepted in both Cammarano and Taxation with Representation that tax benefits
were a form of subsidy. See also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)
("[D]ifferential taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it
threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints ... .
46. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
47. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Lerner v. Casey, 357
U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Barsky v. Board of
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dated employment termination for any "treasonable or seditious
utterance," and required loyalty checks for public school and univer-
sity teachers. 48 Keyishian was decided on vagueness and overbreadth
grounds, but Justice Brennan's majority opinion contains a passionate
defense of academic freedom, including the memorable and subse-
quently much-quoted thought that the First Amendment "does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."49
Following its now well-established viewpoint neutrality principle,
the Court in more recent years has continued to invalidate licensing
and other benefit schemes that give government officials opportunities
for discriminatory decision-making.50 Conversely, it has upheld regu-
lations that cabin decision-maker discretion and thus do not have "the
potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of
view."'"
The Court has also invalidated viewpoint-based criminal laws,
noting, for example, in its 1989 and 1990 flag desecration cases, that
the government's desire to preserve the national symbol was "impli-
cated only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates a
message to others that is inconsistent with [certain asserted patriotic]
ideals. ' 52 Similarly, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,53 the Court invali-
Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
48. 385 U.S. at 592-96.
49. Id at 603. This was because "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection."' Id. (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
50. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992)
(allowing county administrator to adjust parade permit fee based on amount of expected
hostility to speech has potential for discrimination against disfavored views); City of Lake-
wood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g, 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988) ("[A] facial challenge lies whenever
a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate
based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked
speakers . . ").
51. Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981);
see also City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (upholding con-
tent- and viewpoint-neutral restriction on posting of flyers on public utility poles; "the First
Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints
or ideas at the expense of others").
52. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 316 (1990) (emphasis added); see also
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (striking down flag desecration law; "govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable"); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970) (holding
that law permitting wearing of military uniform in theatrical production only "if the por-
trayal does not tend to discredit" armed forces violated First Amendment because individ-
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dated a hate speech law that had been construed narrowly to ban only
constitutionally unprotected "fighting words"54 because the law sin-
gled out for punishment those fighting words that "communicate
messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. "55 R.A. V. teaches
that categorizing some speech as constitutionally unprotected (e.g.,
fighting words, threats, obscenity) is a judicially sanctioned form of
content discrimination; yet even within such categories, government
cannot target disfavored messages. 6
The Supreme Court has thus made plain that the viewpoint neu-
trality principle applies regardless of whether a government action is
direct suppression, "forced speech," as in Barnette ' 7 or manipulation
of benefit and subsidy programs. And it has applied the principle re-
gardless of the medium being regulated. For example, in the 1994
Turner Broadcasting case involving "must-carry" requirements for
transmission of network programming via cable television, Justice
Kennedy, for the Court, explained:
At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our
political system and cultural life rest upon this
ideal.... Government action that stifles speech on account of its
message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message
favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right.
ual cannot be punished "for speaking out against the role of our Army and our country in
Vietnam").
53. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
54. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that "fighting
words" are not protected by the First Amendment because they are "no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality"); infra text accompanying note 125 (describing use of Chaplinsky to justify ob-
scenity exception to First Amendment).
55. 505 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
56. See id. at 388; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1513
n.20 (1996) (Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsberg, JJ., plurality opinion) (reaffirming
this point in R.A.V. and rejecting "the greater power includes the lesser" rationale in the
context of regulating speech); infra note 147.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2; Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241,254-58 (1974) (striking down newspaper right-of-reply statute because it was both
content- and viewpoint-based); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2465
(1994) (stating that statute in Tornillo "conferred benefits to speakers based on
viewpoint").
58. 114 S. Ct. at 2458. Turner Broadcasting held that the "must carry" provisions were
neither content- nor viewpoint-based, and therefore rejected the cable industry's argument
that the strict scrutiny standard of Tornillo, see supra note 57; infra note 105, should apply.
Four Justices in Turner Broadcasting, however, viewed the must-carry requirement as con-
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As Justice Kennedy continued, however, he engaged in a bit of lin-
guistic imprecision that is all too common in this area of the law by
merging the concepts of viewpoint and content: "Our precedents thus
apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disad-
vantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its
content."59
B. Rules About Content
As Justice Kennedy's statement in Turner Broadcasting suggests,
the Supreme Court has sometimes been imprecise in distinguishing
between viewpoint and the more generic concept of content. Indeed,
while solidifying the viewpoint neutrality principle, the Court was also
developing a parallel line of precedent condemning not just view-
point-based but content-based discrimination by government.6 ° In
Police Department v. Mosley,6' the case most frequently cited for this
proposition, the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited all
picketing next to schools, except picketing relating to labor disputes,
and announced in sweeping terms: "Above all else, the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 62
However, depending on the context, government constantly, and
often appropriately, makes decisions that favor some types of speech
over others, based on their subject matter or content. The examples
are legion: art exhibits on particular themes; research grants for par-
ticular projects; merit-based selection decisions by public libraries,
broadcast stations, or arts and humanities endowments; tax exemp-
tions for "educational" or "charitable" groups; other tax benefits of
the type upheld in Cammarano;63 "limited public for[a]" that are legit-
imately "reserv[ed] ... for certain groups or for the discussion of cer-
tain topics"; 64 and "academic judgments as to how best to allocate
gramming. See 114 S. Ct. at 2476-77 (O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Turner Broad., 114 S. Ct. at 2459.
60. For scholarly discussion of content discrimination, including the Supreme Court's
inconsistencies in articulating and applying the doctrine, see Post, supra note 5; Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 46 (1987); Stone, supra note 5; and
Williams, supra note 5.
61. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
62. Id at 95.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
64. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2516-17 (1995)
(citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
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scarce resources," 65 including public school and college curricula. 66
Indeed, the constitutional distinction between "commercial" and
"political" speech, and the First Amendment exceptions for categories
of speech like libel, perjury, extortion, threats, false advertising, or
fighting words, are all explicitly content-based. 67 As Justice Stevens
observed, the much-vaunted Mosley quote, although "often cited as a
proposition of law.., is perhaps more accurately described as a goal
or an ideal, for the Court's decisions do, in actuality, tolerate quite a
bit of content-based regulation. 68
65. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276
(1981)).
66. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278-80 (Stevens, J., concurring) (indicating that pub-
lic university may legitimately engage in some types of content discrimination, for example,
favoring rehearsal of Hamlet to Mickey Mouse cartoons for priority access to meeting
space, but it may not discriminate based on "its agreement or disagreement with the view-
point of a particular speaker"); Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) (holding that aspiring scholar has no right to publication in
state-funded law review; "the acceptance or rejection of articles submitted for publication
in a law school law review necessarily involves the exercise of editorial judgment"); Finley
v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (finding
merit-based arts grants-unlike criteria such as "decency"-present no First Amendment
problem), affd, No. 92-56028, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28837 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996); cf.
Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding
scientific research grants may be based on government decisions about what type of re-
search deserves support, but not subjected to unconstitutional conditions).
This is not to say that content-based judgments about intellectual or artistic merit are
never colored by ideological, that is, viewpoint-based, attitudes and assumptions. But at
least the argument that decisions ostensibly founded on merit are really viewpoint-based is
a testable hypothesis in any given case. "Pretext" is a fact that courts are equipped to
identify; and although ideology may sometimes be difficult to separate from "neutral" stan-
dards of merit, it is imprecise to say that there can never be a distinction. Librarians, for
example, tend to make very different professional judgments about book selection when
they are not under pressure from highly politicized school boards or other public officials
than when they are. American Library Association standards help avoid politicization and
keep the focus on professional judgment, as do evaluations of books by teachers and others
professionally trained to assess the quality and educational appropriateness of possible li-
brary selections. See, e.g., American Library Association, Library Bill of Rights (adopted
June 18, 1948; amended Feb. 2, 1961, June 27, 1967, and Jan. 23, 1980) (providing, inter alia,
that "all libraries are forums for information and ideas"; "[m]aterials should not be ex-
cluded because of the origin, background, or views of those contributing to their
creation").
67. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,416-26,430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring), for Justice Stevens's extensive discussion of this point: "[W]e have implicitly distin-
guished between restrictions on expression based on subject matter and restrictions based
on viewpoint, indicating that the latter are particularly pernicious .... "). Cf. City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038,2047 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting criticism of con-
tent discrimination doctrine).
68. Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1304
(1993). Stevens cited the following examples: the content-based ban on political speech
within 100 feet of polling places, upheld in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), see
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Consider, in particular, the "nonpublic forum" cases of Perry Ed-
ucation Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n69 and Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.70 Since Hague v.
CIO,71 the public forum concept has been a staple of First Amend-
ment doctrine, but it was not until Perry and Cornelius that the Court
developed its three-tiered approach, evaluating speech restrictions in
public places based upon whether the forum involved is a traditional
public forum, a designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum.72
Where a forum is nonpublic,73 the government may restrict access
based on content if "the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view."'74 In Cornelius, the Court elaborated:
Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on sub-ject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the fo-
rum and are viewpoint-neutral.... Although a speaker may be
excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic
not encompassed within the purpose of the forum... or if he is
not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit
the forum was created .. .the government violates the First
infra text accompanying notes 76-78; the "gag rule" prohibiting discussion of abortion in
federally funded clinics, upheld in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); distinctions made
by courts about the content of alleged defamatory statements in, for example, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and "countless decisions" made by public uni-
versity administrators about the content of educational materials. See Justice Stevens,
supra at 1305.
69. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
70. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
71. 307 U.S. 496 (1939); see supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
72. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-806; see also Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), where the court stated that:
[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it
has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have ob-
served a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may
be permissible if it preserves the purposes of the limited forum, and, on the other
hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.
id. at 2517; United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,726-30 (1990) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing reasonable content-based restrictions on speech in nonpublic fora are constitutional
provided they are viewpoint-neutral). For criticism of the rigidities of public forum analy-
sis, see G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv.
949; Daniel Farber & John Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Con-
tent and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984); and John
V. Snyder, Note, Forum over Substance: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, 35 CAT-. U. L. REv. 307 (1985).
73. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The school's internal mail system in Perry and the
federal employee charity drive in Cornelius were found to be nonpublic fora.
74. Id. at 46.
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Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to sup-
press the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible
subject.75
Thus, despite the superficial appeal of the Supreme Court's
sweeping language in Mosley, it cannot be understood to condemn all
government restrictions on expression based on subject matter or con-
tent. Such restrictions are not allowed in traditional public fora like
sidewalks-the venue involved in Mosley-but they are allowed in
numerous other contexts.
The 1992 decision in Burson v. Freeman76 nicely illustrates this
distinction. The Court upheld a content-based but viewpoint-neutral
ban on political campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place. Con-
text-the time and place of the speech in question-combined with
the state's compelling interest in assuring the right to vote freely and
the integrity of the election process, were held to justify the ban.77
Whether or not one agrees that the government had a compelling in-
terest in Burson, the content-based law obviously would have been
unconstitutional had it prohibited some but not all campaign speech
based on the viewpoint expressed.78 Arguably, strict scrutiny was an
unduly harsh standard to apply to the nonpartisan content-based regu-
lation in Burson, although strict scrutiny, if not per se invalidation,
would have applied to viewpoint discrimination in such circumstances.
Yet, the line of cases flowing from Mosley that broadly condemn
content discrimination has continued. In Carey v. Brown,79 the Court
reaffirmed the Mosley language, using the terms "message," "con-
tent," and "subject matter" interchangeably,"° even though the dis-
75. 473 U.S. at 806 (citations omitted). Cornelius upheld exclusion of political and
legal advocacy organizations from a federal charity drive because, according to the Court,
the discrimination was based merely on subject matter and speaker, not viewpoint-even
though one justification for the exclusion was to avoid controversy. Id. at 808. The Corne-
lius Court did, however, recognize the ease with which content restrictions can be pretexts
for the suppression of ideas, especially when the discrimination is against "controversial"
speech: "[T]he purported concern to avoid controversy excited by particular groups may
conceal a bias against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded speakers." Id. at 812.
76. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
77. See id. at 199-206; see also Hevesi v. Metropolitan Trans. Auth., 827 F. Supp. 1069,
1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that government had compelling interest in content-based
exclusion of all political candidate campaign ads).
78. For example, a law permitting signs favoring incumbent candidates but banning
signs criticizing them or favoring their challengers would be blatantly and impermissibly
viewpoint-based.
79. 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (striking down a statute that prohibited all picketing of resi-
dences excepting labor picketing).
80. Id. at 459-63; see also Longo v. United States Postal Serv., 953 F.2d 790, 796 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("The term 'content' embodies several related, yet different concepts. ... The
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crimination there, as in Mosley, was by subject matter and not
viewpoint. Likewise, Carey's companion case, Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Service Commission,81 found restrictions on speech in-
volving "controversial issues of public policy" to be content- and not
viewpoint-based, but nonetheless struck them down. In highly gener-
alized language, the Court unhelpfully fused the two concepts: "To
allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public de-
bate would be to allow that government control over the search for
political truth."'  This proposition has great rhetorical appeal, but
does not account for the many situations where government may legit-
imately limit the "permissible subjects for debate," for example, uni-
versity classrooms, or school board meetings, where different
viewpoints must be allowed but certainly the subject matter can be
limited to the items on the agenda.83
distinction between content and viewpoint ... is occasionally blurred .... ") (citing Clark v.
Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (holding regulation was
content-neutral because not applied on grounds of disagreement with message presented)
and United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 135
(1981) (holding regulation prohibiting unstamped mail was content-neutral because "not
directed at the content of the message appellees seek to convey")), vacated and remanded,
506 U.S. 802, adhered to, 983 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1992), and cert. denied, 509 U.S. 904 (1993);
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1991) (upholding content-neutral tax that sin-
gled out cable television medium but reiterating that "differential taxation of First Amend-
ment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of
particular ideas or viewpoints .... [T]he fear is censorship.... [A] tax will trigger height-
ened scrutiny under the First Amendment if it discriminates on the basis of the content of
taxpayer speech").
81. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
82. Id. at 538; see infra text accompanying notes 90-92. The order arose from an envi-
ronmental group's attempt to gain access to billing envelopes for an antinuclear power
message to counter the utility's mailing of material extolling the glories of nuclear energy.
The commission evidently decided that enforced silence on all sides was the best policy.
The Supreme Court disagreed: "The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regula-
tion extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic." Id. at 537 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95).
83. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45-55 (1983). For cases in which the Court has relied on the broad Mosley language,
see Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987), invalidating a state tax
that singled out magazines with certain subject matter and Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983), invalidating a tax that
not only singled out the press for special burdens but discriminated against a small number
of magazines based on size. The D.C. Circuit has pointed out that underinclusive laws like
those in Ragland and Minneapolis Star, that "single[ ] out some conduct for adverse treat-
ment, and leave[ ] untouched conduct that seems indistinguishable in terms of the law's
ostensible purpose" are "bound to raise a suspicion that the law's true target is the




Similarly, Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board8l voided a statute that singled out stories of past
crimes for burdensome regulation, reaffirming Mosley and noting that
not only viewpoint but also content discrimination is constitutionally
suspect.8 5 The Court did not explain why content discrimination in
contexts like Simon & Schuster is condemned, while in other contexts
like Perry and Cornelius it is permitted.
Undoubtedly, the difference has to do in part with the fact that
Perry and Cornelius involved government property that had not been
opened as public fora for citizen speech, while the restrictions in Mos-
ley and Carey applied to public fora, and in Simon & Schuster to
speech generated privately. Yet these differences are more factual
than analytical. They do not explain why content-neutral restrictions
on speech should not also be condemned when targeted to public fora
or private property.8 6 If the truly compelling First Amendment princi-
ple is viewpoint neutrality, is there really need for a separate content
neutrality rule that is so rife with exceptions and so often articulated
in fuzzy language that merges the two concepts? At the very least, the
content discrimination doctrine might be less necessary to protect un-
derlying First Amendment values if viewpoint discrimination were
properly understood to include the categories of "political," "contro-
versial," or "offensive" ideas.
C. Political, Controversial, and Religious Speech
Returning to the Burson v. Freeman hypothetical discussed
above: it surely would have been as unconstitutional to ban only
"controversial" campaign signs within 100 feet of a polling place as it
would have been to ban only signs favoring a particular viewpoint.
Not only would such a restriction give undue discretion to government
officials to decide what is "controversial" in the highly charged con-
text of a political campaign, it would almost by definition discriminate
against nonmainstream candidates and ideas. The example helps illus-
84. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
85. Id. at 117 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 592).
86. Indeed, cases and commentators have recognized the dangers in content-neutral
restrictions that are overbroad. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (striking down ban on federal employees' receipt of honora-
ria for speeches or articles); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (treating munic-
ipal ban on private property signs as content-neutral but striking it down nonetheless);
Post, supra note 5 (critiquing content-neutrality doctrine as arid, incoherent, and un-
grounded in social realities); Williams, supra note 5 (criticizing application of lower scru-
tiny to content-neutral regulations that may have effect of suppressing speech).
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trate why categorizing speech as "political," "controversial," or "of-
fensive" is usually a proxy for suppressing the ideas presented.
Yet the Supreme Court indicated in several cases before Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia87 that it did
not understand discrimination against "controversial" or "political"
speech to be viewpoint-based. The 1974 decision in Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights88 perhaps set the tone for this line of cases. Lehman
upheld a ban on political advertising on city buses because, according
to the four-judge plurality, the advertising space was not a public fo-
rum, busriders were a "captive audience," city managers reasonably
limited the space to "innocuous and less controversial commercial and
service oriented advertising," and the policy was not "arbitrary, capri-
cious or invidious. " 89
In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission,90 by con-
trast, the Court at least addressed the viewpoint discrimination con-
cerns raised by an agency ban on "public policy" inserts in utility bill
mailings. The Court accepted the Commission's argument that the
content-based ban did "not favor either side of a political contro-
versy,"91 but invalidated it nonetheless as an unconstitutional restric-
tion on "permissible subjects for public debate. '92 The Court thus
appeared to recognize that suppressing "political" or "controversial"
87. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995); see infra text accompanying notes 112-19.
88. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
89. Id. at 304, 303. Justice Douglas's concurrence relied primarily on the "captive au-
dience" theory. Id. at 306, 307. Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Stewart, Mar-
shall, and Powell, argued that to "sanction the city's preference for bland commercialism
and noncontroversial public service messages over 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'
debate on public issues, would reverse the traditional priorities of the First Amendment."
Id. at 315 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). The dissent
understood the ban as viewpoint-based even though discriminating "among entire classes
of ideas," and demonstrated how it would operate to allow product advertisements but
squelch anti-product messages, for example, pleas for environmental protection. Id. at
316-17.
90. 447 U.S. 530 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
91. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537.
92. Id. at 538. The Court distinguished Lehman, 418 U.S. 298, and Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976), which upheld a military base ban on partisan political speech as "narrow
exceptions to the general prohibition against subject-matter distinctions," justified because
in those circumstances political speech "would disrupt the operation of governmental facil-
ities even though other forms of speech posed no such danger." Consolidated Edison, 447
U.S. at 539. Justice Stevens, concurring in Consolidated Edison, argued that a subject mat-
ter ban on politically controversial speech is unconstitutional per se, because it is such an
obvious vehicle for skewing public debate. Id. at 545-48. Justice Stevens saw no real dis-
tinction between content and viewpoint discrimination in the context of potentially contro-
versial speech. Id. at 546; see also Stone, supra note 5, at 90-92 (criticizing Lehman for its
result orientation and failure to reconcile Mosley).
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speech is, in both purpose and effect, very like viewpoint discrimina-
tion. Yet, in Cornelius (five years later), the Court not only tolerated
excluding a category of "controversial" speech from a nonpublic fo-
rum, it approved the exclusion precisely because it seemed "reason-
ably" designed to avoid the appearance of political favoritism.93
The problem of categorizing "controversial" or "political" speech
arose again in FCC v. League of Women Voters,9 4 where the Court
invalidated a ban on "editorializing" by broadcasters that received
public funds. The FCC and the Court interpreted the ban to suppress
opinions about "controversial issues of public importance." 95 The
Supreme Court's decision again rested only on content discrimination,
although the Court quoted the language from Consolidated Edison
linking suppression of speech on "controversial issues of public pol-
icy" with viewpoint restrictions.96 Moreover, the ban on editorializing
targeted controversial political speech, which the Court emphasized
has always rested on the "'highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values,"' 97 and is "'indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth.' ' 98 Yet the Court backed off from equating
"controversial" or "political" with "viewpoint-based," returning in-
stead to the statement in Consolidated Edison that the First Amend-
ment extended to restrictions on discussion of an entire topic99-an
unhelpful point analytically since precisely such restrictions were up-
held in Perry and Cornelius in the context of nonpublic fora, while in
Taxation with Representation"° discrimination in subsidy programs
93. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,809 (1985);
supra text accompanying notes 69-75; see also Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04 (stating that
potentially controversial nature of political ads justified exclusion from city buses).
94. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
95. Id at 381 (quoting Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C. 2d 297, 302 (1973)).
96. ld. at 383-84; see supra text accompanying notes 81-82. In FCC v. League of Wo-
men Voters, only the public broadcasting stations themselves were prohibited from expres-
sing their views through editorials; they were free to carry programs on controversial
subjects airing the views of others. Id. at 383-84. Thus, the Court found that even if some
of the interests asserted by the government in support of the ban were "sufficiently sub-
stantial" to justify the restriction on speech, the restriction was "not crafted with sufficient
precision to remedy those dangers." Id. at 398-99.
97. ld at 381 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982), and
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
98. Id at 383 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 483, and Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
99. See id at 384.
100. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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against certain types of speech activity (viz. lobbying) was also
upheld. 1 1
League of Women Voters may have maintained the "content/
viewpoint" distinction and kept discrimination against "controversial"
or "political" speech on the "content" side of the line, but it did so in a
way that blurred the boundaries even more than in Consolidated
Edison, and it certainly implied that where "controversial" or "polit-
ical" expression is suppressed, the policy in question is automatically
suspect, and an exacting type of First Amendment scrutiny must fol-
low. In a sense, "controversial" or "political" speech now seemed to
occupy a borderland between explicit suppression of specific ideas and
types of content discrimination deemed to be relatively untroubling as
a First Amendment matter-for example, subject matter restrictions
on access to nonpublic fora, or merit-based curriculum decisions in
public universities.
But if League of Women Voters seemed to weaken the bounda-
ries, the Court in Boos v. Barry'0 2 four years later resurrected the con-
tent/viewpoint distinction in an almost Jesuitical way. Although the
Court struck down a regulation that prohibited signs bringing a for-
eign government "into public disrepute" within 500 feet of that gov-
ernment's embassy, Justice O'Connor, speaking for a plurality, said
the law was viewpoint-neutral since it did not ban specific ideas. 10 3
Rather, it neutrally banned any view critical of a particular
government. 04
This is a crabbed definition of viewpoint, to say the least. Al-
lowing affirmative and uncritical opinions to be expressed, but not
101. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 41-45. The Court in League of Women
Voters distinguished Taxation with Representation on the ground that some of the broad-
casters involved in League of Women Voters received as little as 1% of their income from
government funds but were still barred from editorializing, thereby placing the case in the
"unconstitutional conditions" rather than the subsidy category. See League of Women Vot-
ers, 468 U.S. at 399-401; supra note 33; text accompanying notes 38-49. This distinction,
however, only demonstrated that the Court analyzes limits on subsidy programs differently
from unconstitutional conditions, that is, relinquishments of rights imposed as conditions
of government benefits. It does not explain why content discrimination is acceptable in
one context and not in another.
102. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
103. See id. at 319.
104. See id. Justices Brennan and Marshall did not join in this portion of Justice
O'Connor's opinion for reasons unrelated to the content/viewpoint distinction. See id. at
334-39 (taking issue with Court's earlier holding in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41 (1986), that explicitly content-based laws can nevertheless sometimes be deemed
content-neutral if aimed at the "secondary effects" of speech-there, alleged crime and
other social ills associated with adult entertainment).
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negative or critical ones, appears to be classic viewpoint discrimina-
tion, even in its narrowest sense. As Justice O'Connor acknowledged,
dissenting views on matters of international politics are precisely the
type of speech that is ordinarily recognized as within the core of First
Amendment concern. 05 Moreover, acquiescence in the ideological
objections of others to controversial political opinions-whether those
others be politicians, community leaders, or foreign governments-is
simply a more subtle form of viewpoint discrimination, and is thus not
an acceptable justification for suppressing speech. 10 6 But content dis-
crimination was enough to invalidate the regulation in Boos, given
that the ban silenced "public discussion of an entire topic," 0 7 and that
the censored speech would take place in the "traditional public fora"
105. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 318; see also League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381-82;
cases cited supra note 14. Compare Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), where the Court found viewpoint discrimination in analogous cir-
cumstances: a requirement that utilities allow opposing points of view on political issues in
their billing envelopes. In both Boos and Pacific Gas, the government mandate was not
explicitly viewpoint-based but was triggered by reference to a viewpoint expressed by
others-in Boos a foreign government; in Pacific Gas a private utility. Yet in Pacific Gas
the Court made the mental leap that eluded it in Boos, observing that, as in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the private speaker's "expression of a par-
ticular viewpoint triggered an obligation to permit other speakers, with whom the [private
speaker] disagreed, to use the [private speaker's] facilities to spread their own
message.... [B]y forcing the [private speaker] to disseminate opponents' views, the statute
penalized the [private speaker's] own expression," Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 10.
106. Acquiescence in the viewpoint discrimination of others is outside the scope of this
Article. Suffice it to note that several courts have observed that illegitimate purpose and
adverse effect on speech are present when acquiescence is at work just as when govern-
ment decisionmakers are themselves hostile toward the expression in question. See, e.g.,
Gay & Lesbian Students v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 367 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that
homophobic political pressure from legislators was not a justification for denying funding
to student group); Brown v. Board of Regents, 640 F. Supp. 674, 679 (D. Neb. 1986) (can-
celling of film Hail Mary because of complaints from religious community and fear of con-
troversy); Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302,308 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (firing
teacher because of majoritarian pressure and desire to avoid controversy); Wilson v. Chan-
cellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1364 (D. Ore. 1976) (banning communist speaker "in order to
placate angry residents and taxpayers"); DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1344,
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990) (cancelling of theatrical production because of political
pressure); Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9
HARV. J.L. & P. PoL'Y 461,466 (1986) (arguing that speech restrictions triggered by "hos-
tile audience" have "distinct viewpoint-differential effects" and thus "should be tested by
standards of viewpoint based review"); cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding community bias against mentally retarded not an acceptable
justification for discrimination); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding socie-
tal racism not an acceptable justification for discrimination); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917) (stating that racial segregation cannot be sustained upon the grounds of societal
acceptance).
107. 485 U.S. at 319 (quoting Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 537 (1980)).
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of streets and sidewalks. °8 Because removing an entire subject matter
from public discussion is not content-neutral, the regulation failed
under classic public forum analysis.' 0 9
The Supreme Court took a markedly more expansive approach to
viewpoint five years later in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District.1 0 In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that a
school district's refusal to permit the showing of a film with a religious
perspective on child rearing and family values during nonschool hours
was impermissibly viewpoint-based where secular groups were al-
lowed to use school premises during these same hours to address the
same subject matter."' The Lamb's Chapel majority did not seem
concerned that there are countless differing, even opposing, "reli-
gious" perspectives on family life; the views of some religions on child
rearing, birth control, divorce, or premarital sex are undoubtedly
closer to those of many secular groups than to those of other religions.
Ignoring its much more niggardly construction of viewpoint in Boos,
the Lamb's Chapel Court expanded the concept of viewpoint to em-
brace broad "perspectives" such as religion.
Any thought that Lamb's Chapel might be an aberration was put
to rest two years later in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia,"2 which struck down, as impermissibly view-
point-based, a state university rule excluding religious publications
from eligibility for student activity funds. Merging its Mosley" 3 line
of precedents with language in cases like Perry and Cornelius that ap-
plies the principle of viewpoint neutrality to government benefits and
subsidies, the Court said that "[v]iewpoint discrimination is ... an
108. Id. at 318 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
109. See id. at 318-19, 321-22. The Boos Court rejected the government's attempted
argument by analogy to the adult zoning case of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41 (1986), that the regulation was legitimately directed to the perceived adverse "secon-
dary effects" of critical speech in proximity to foreign embassies. Listener reaction to
speech, as the Court pointed out, is not the type of adverse effect it said could legitimately
be regulated in Renton-that is, an effect unrelated to content. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320-21;
see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) (finding
possibility of public disorder not a secondary effect within the meaning of Renton because
it depends on public's reaction to content of speech).
110. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
111. See id. at 390-91. Justice White wrote the majority opinion; Justices Kennedy and
Scalia (joined by Thomas) filed concurrences, primarily to articulate their own views on the
district's Establishment Clause defense. None addressed the expansion of the concept of
viewpoint.
112. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62, 79-85.
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egregious form of content discrimination," and is not a permissible
basis for disfavoring speech.1 1 4
In Rosenberger, as in Lamb's Chapel, it was the plaintiffs' reli-
gious viewpoint, not simply religious "content," as the University ar-
gued, that drove the exclusion.115 The Court acknowledged that "the
distinction is not a precise one," and indeed, that "[i]t is, in a sense,
something of an understatement to speak of religious thought and dis-
cussion as just a viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of
thought.""16 Nevertheless, the University's exclusion was viewpoint-
based because it permitted funding of publications that approached
the subject matter of religion from secular perspectives, but "se-
lect[ed] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with
religious editorial viewpoints.""117
The five-justice majority in Rosenberger rejected the dissenters'
Boos-based argument that the University guidelines were viewpoint-
neutral because they discriminated against "an entire class of view-
points."" 8 Public debate, observed the majority, is not "bipolar":
"[T]he complex and multifaceted nature of public discourse has not
embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of
ideas.... The dissent's declaration that debate is not skewed so long
as multiple voices are silenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed
in multiple ways."" 9
This insight is critical to the theory of viewpoint discrimination.
And it applies equally to "political" or "controversial" speech as it
does to religious speech. Multiple voices are silenced; "the debate is
skewed in multiple ways" when those expounding "political" or "con-
troversial" ideas are denied government benefits such as tax exemp-
114. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516. The majority distinguished Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991), upholding a restriction on discussion of abortion in family planning clinics
that received federal funds, on the ground that in Rust the ban was not applied to "a
program to encourage private speech," but instead governed only private speakers used by
the government "to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program." Rosen-
berger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519; see infra Part IV (discussing government speech).
115. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2518.
119. Id. The Court disposed of some amici's argument that the Establishment Clause
prohibits direct government funding of religion in part by pointing out that the University's
check went to the printer of the student publication, not the student group itself, i. at
2524-a dubious distinction. The University had abandoned reliance on the Establishment
Clause even though it was the basis for the Fourth Circuit's decision upholding the funding
disqualification. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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tions, access to government property, and the opportunity to compete
for grants and subsidies. As Justice Brennan pointed out, dissenting in
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,2 ° discrimination does not become
"any less odious" when it is "among entire classes of ideas, rather than
among points of view within a particular class."' 21
The Court has repeatedly recognized that controversial political
viewpoints are "the essence of First Amendment expression." 122 The
viewpoint neutrality rule is designed precisely to protect this "es-
sence" by preventing government suppression of controversial or
otherwise disfavored ideas. That purpose is ill-served, as the Lamb's
Chapel and Rosenberger Courts recognized, if government may ac-
complish its goal by suppressing an entire category of viewpoints-be
they religious, "political," "controversial," or "offensive." Speech that
is controversial, that "'induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatis-
faction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger,"' 2 3
is precisely the speech most in need of constitutional protection. Ro-
senberger, which refused to permit government to "skew" public de-
bate by disadvantaging whole categories of ideas, compels the
conclusion that restrictions on speech deemed "political," "offensive,"
or "controversial," must be understood as viewpoint-based.
H. Sex, Vulgarity, and Offensiveness
Of all the types of speech historically deemed "controversial" or
"offensive" in American society, speech about sex has frequently been
at or near the top of the list. Second-class constitutional citizenship
for sexual speech officially began in 1957 when the Supreme Court
ruled in Roth v. United States24 that although sex is a "great and mys-
terious motive force in human life," so that most art, literature, and
other expression on the subject is protected by the First Amendment,
there is nevertheless a subcategory of sex-related speech, so-called ob-
scenity, that may be prohibited because it is "utterly without redeem-
ing social importance" and "'no essential part of any exposition of
120. 418 U.S. 298 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
121. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also The Supreme Court,
1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARv. L. REv. 111, 215 (1995) (positing that after Rosen-
berger, bans on "political" or "race-related" speech must be seen as viewpoint-based).
122. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995); see cases cited
supra note 14; see also, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,381 (1984); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 538 (1980); Id. at 545-48 (Stevens, J., concurring); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
123. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-09 (quoting Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4).
124. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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ideas." '125 Although "redeeming social importance" is a strange value
judgment to repose in courts and other government agencies, at least
Roth established that most speech about sex is constitutionally
protected.
In Miller v. California,26 sixteen years after Roth, the Court mod-
ified its definition of obscenity 2 7 but reiterated that a line exists that
separates "obscenity" from constitutionally protected speech about
sex.1' The Court now, however, articulated a test for locating that
"dim and uncertain" line,129 that turned in part on "offensive-
ness"130 -a content- if not viewpoint-based concept that the Court has
otherwise insisted is not a permissible basis for restricting speech.131
Despite challenges, such as those raised by the defendant in
Miller, the Court has adhered to its pronouncement in Roth that some
sexual expression lacks constitutional protection because it is "no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas.' 32 Indeed, even sexual speech
125. I. at 484, 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
The origin of this language in Chaplinsky was Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr, FREEDOM
OF SPEECH 170 (1920). See David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and
Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REv. 47, 54 n.40
(1992). Rabban points out that before the 1920s, many free speech advocates had a more
expansive view of what the First Amendment protected (including, decidedly, speech
about sex) than did Chafee, the early ACLU, or other champions of a more narrowly
"political" concept.
126. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
127. The familiar Miller three-part test for obscenity requires the government to prove
that the material, taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex; that the material
depicts or describes specific sexual conduct, as defined by applicable state law, in a manner
that is patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards; and that the
material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at
24; see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1985) (clarifying that
"prurient" means morbid or shameful, not healthy, interest in sex).
128. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 27, 35, 36 (limiting obscenity to "hard core" porno-
graphic materials; the "public portrayal of hard core sexual conduct for its own sake, and
for the ensuing commercial gain"). In some communities, of course, even hard core por-
nography may not be "patently offensive." See, e.g., United States v. Various Articles of
Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132, 136-37 (2d Cir. 1983).
129. The line is "dim and uncertain," as the Court had admitted ten years before in
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
130. See supra note 127. The "patent offensiveness" prong of the obscenity test was
introduced in Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,418 (1966).
131. See supra note 52; infra text accompanying notes 149-52. See, e.g., Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (citing thirteen Supreme Court precedents in support of the
proposition that government "may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
132. Justice Brennan, dissenting in a companion case to Miller, admitted that he had
been wrong sixteen years earlier in his opinion for the Court in Roth to think that a coher-
ent line could be drawn between obscenity and constitutionally protected expression with
sexual content. Joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, Brennan urged the invalidation of
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that clearly contains ideas has lost protection since Miller. Judicially
approved censorship of sexually oriented expression, for example,
now includes the FCC's regulation of programming it deems "inde-
cent" on radio and television,' 33 removal of classic, raunchy literary
works from school curricula, 34 and punishment of students for sexual
innuendos delivered at school assemblies. 35 It also encompasses
nude entertainment, at least if not presented in upscale artistic ye-
all obscenity laws that applied to consenting adults largely on grounds of incurable vague-
ness. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973). Justice Brennan admitted
that:
[A]fter 16 years of experimentation and debate I am reluctantly forced to the
conclusion that none of the available formulas, including the one announced to-
day, can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level .... Any effort to draw a
constitutionally acceptable boundary on state power must resort to such indefi-
nite concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,'
and the like. The meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with the experi-
ence, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining them. Although we
have assumed that obscenity does exist and that we 'know it when [we] see it,'
Jacobellis v. Ohio.... we are manifestly unable to describe it in advance except by
reference to concepts so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between pro-
tected and unprotected speech.
Id. (citations omitted).
133. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter ACT III]; Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 914 (1992); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1988). Compare Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), which held that
"indecency" is protected by First Amendment and cannot be banned outright in telephone
communications, with Dial Information Services Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992), and Information Providers Coalition for De-
fense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991), which approved "inde-
cency" regulation of commercial telephone services to restrict access by minors.
"Indecency" is defined by the FCC as "language or material that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs." ACT III, supra at 657;
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732. In 1992, Congress used this "indecency" definition as a standard
for censoring expression on public and leased access cable television channels. See Denver
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (upholding one
and striking down two sections of the 1992 cable television indecency law). In February
1996 Congress imported the indecency standard into legislation to criminalize online com-
puter display of "indecent" speech in a manner "available" to minors; four months later, a
three-judge federal court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the law, ruling that it im-
permissibly censored valuable online communications. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824
(E.D. Pa.) (three-judge court), probable juris. noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1996);
see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), juris statementfiled
(Oct. 15, 1996).
134. See Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989); infra text accompanying
notes 174-78.




nues, 136 and burdensome zoning regulation of adult book and video
stores.137 Despite the emphasis in Roth on the importance of protect-
ing ideas and information about sexuality, that "great and mysterious
motive force," and the Court's reiteration in Sable Communications v.
Federal Communications Commission 38 that nonobscene speech
about sex is protected by the First Amendment, the Court has never-
theless, as a practical matter, relegated sexual speech in many contexts
to a lesser constitutional status, even if the speech has significant liter-
ary or other value and comes nowhere close to the obscenity line.139
The justification for this shrinking of constitutional protection for
speech about sex is more an attitude than a theory. The attitude was
most memorably expressed by Justice Stevens's plurality opinion in an
adult zoning case, Young v. American Mini Theatres.4 ° "[Flew of us,"
wrote Stevens, "would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhib-
ited in the theaters of our choice." " ' Chief Justice Burger conveyed
the same judicial attitude in somewhat less catchy prose in Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton.'42 The state has a compelling interest in "order and
morality," 43 said Burger, and specifically in
136. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (describing nude bar-
room-type dancing as only "marginally" protected by the First Amendment). One court
pre-Barnes held nude dancing to be entirely without First Amendment protection, Walker
v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80, 85 (8th Cir. 1990); others held the opposite, for exam-
ple, Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc, 501 U.S. 560. But cf Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975) (prohibiting drive-in theaters from exhibiting films containing
nudity is unconstitutionally overbroad and content-based).
137. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Renton was
premised on the unusual proposition that regulations specifically targeting adult entertain-
ment are not content-based if they are aimed at controlling the materials' alleged "secon-
dary effects": crime, prostitution, and urban blight. Id. at 47-51; see supra note 109.
Similar regulations had been upheld in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976), but the Young decision was more candid than Renton because it did not pretend
that such zoning was content-neutral; it simply asserted that the discrimination was justi-
fied by the government's interest in avoiding the asserted adverse effects of adult en-
tertainment. Id. at 63-73. Justice Powell, concurring in Young, proposed the "secondary
effects" test later used in Renton; see 427 U.S. at 73-84.
138. 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment ...
139. See supra notes 133-37.
140. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
141. Id. at 70.
142. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
143. Id. at 61.
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quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of
commerce in the great city centers, and possibly, the public
safety itself...
The sum of experience ... affords ample basis for legisla-
tures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the de-
velopment of human personality, can be debased and distorted
by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Consti-
tution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion and act-
ing on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive
evidence or empirical data:"
The notion inherent in Chief Justice Burger's argument, that
speech may be prohibited based on subjective judgments about sexual
morality, "community welfare," and "development of the human per-
sonality," without even empirical evidence of harm, may seem oddly
out of whack with the Court's frequent pronouncements against laws
"aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 45 Certainly, the no-
tion that pornography, or "crass commercial exploitation" of sexual-
ity, is debasing or harms the institution of marriage is a value
judgment in the profoundest sense, embodying ideas about sex, mar-
riage, family, and community that one would think the First Amend-
ment entitles citizens to question, challenge, and reject.'46 Chief
Justice Burger's peroration in Slaton itself demonstrates that, despite
the Court's protestations that obscenity is "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas," the obscenity exception to the First Amendment
has everything to do with government suppression of ideas about sex
that it does not like. In other words, the justification for obscenity law
is a "court-approved system of values."' 4 7
144. Id at 58, 63. The Court noted but did not rely upon opinions of some experts that
pornography "may induce antisocial conduct by the average person." Id. at 58 n.8.
145. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,519 (1958); see supra text accompanying notes 32,
38-40.
146. As Justice Brennan noted in his Slaton dissent, "'explicit sexual materials are
sought as a source of entertainment and information by substantial numbers of American
adults. At times, these materials also appear to serve to increase and facilitate constructive
communication about sexual matters within [a] marriage."' 413 U.S. at 108 n.26 (quoting
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBscENrY AND PORNOGRAPHY 53 (1970)) (emphasis
added).
147. P. Heath Brookwell, Grappling with Miller v. California: The Search for an Alter-
native Approach to Regulating Obscenity, 24 CurmB. L. REv. 131, 138 (1993-94).
The Supreme Court has recognized that viewpoint bias may creep into obscenity or
indecency enforcement. Thus, Justice Stevens in his plurality opinion in Pacifica, 438 U.S.
726 (1978), upholding the FCC's ban on the broadcast during all but late-night hours of
certain "filthy words" that the agency deemed "indecent," opined that the bawdy words in
the comic monologue at issue in the case were "'no essential part of any exposition of
ideas,"' and were only censored by the FCC because of their shock value, not because of
MIo. 24:99
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The Court's failure to see its value-laden condemnation of "ob-
scenity" as viewpoint-based 4 8 is especially troubling in light of Miller
v. California's incorporation of "patent offensiveness" in the test for
determining constitutional status. "Offensiveness" is not a permissi-
ble standard for government regulation of any other category of
speech.149 As the Court recognized in both Cohen v. California5 ° and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,' offensive, outrageous, scabrous, sexu-
ally loaded speech often has deep political implications:
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of sup-
pressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon
their "political content," id. at 746. Justice Stevens even conceded that the monologue
presented a "point of view; it attempts to show that the words it uses are 'harmless' and
that our attitudes toward them are 'essentially silly."' Id. at 746 n.22. However, Justice
Stevens insisted that the FCC did not punish the broadcaster for this reason. See id.
Likewise, as the Supreme Court explained in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992), striking down a hate speech law that discriminated against racist and other perni-
cious viewpoints, even within an unprotected category of speech like fighting words or
obscenity, government may not single out for punishment only disfavored messages. See
supra text accompanying notes 53-56. An obscenity law, for example, may not punish only
material that promotes the idea of nonprocreative sex, purely for pleasure, while exempt-
ing equally explicit material with the message that only procreative sex is acceptable. See
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (citing Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1041 (1991)). The Court in R.A.V. did not explain why this distinc-
tion is viewpoint-based while a distinction between sex that sends a message of "crass com-
mercial exploitation" and sex that promotes "family values" is not.
148. Two U.S. courts have perceived that suppression of sexual or "indecent" content
amounts to viewpoint discrimination. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, No.
92-56028, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28837, at *3, *25-31 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996) (holding
requirement that arts funding agency "'take into consideration general standards of de-
cency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public"' in awarding
grants is impermissibly viewpoint- based (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1))); American
Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F. Supp. 811, 814 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that deci-
sion by Librarian of Congress to bow to congressional threats and stop subsidizing transla-
tion of Playboy magazine into braille based on the magazine's "sexual orientation" was
viewpoint-based); cf. Lakeland Lounge v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1257 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993) (finding adult zoning restrictions were not based
on distaste for message communicated); Craft v. Hodel, 683 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D. Mass.
1988) ("[P]ublic nudity does not convey any specific message; at most it is a medium by
which a variety of messages may be conveyed .... ).
149. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-26 (1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 8 (1949); Pent-
house Int'l, Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that denial of
access to subway advertising public forum display space based on "offensive" content of
magazine violated First Amendment; "[i]t is precisely this speech for which the protection
of the First Amendment was intended").
150. 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971).
151. 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
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seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.'52
The problem is magnified in the context of the "indecency" ban on
radio and television, where the FCC uses a "patent offensiveness"
standard, without even the "prurient interest" and "serious value" ele-
ments of the Miller definition to cabin its freewheeling application. 3
Apart from the problematic incorporation of an "offensiveness"
test in obscenity and indecency law, the notion that sexual speech-
even hardcore pornography-lacks any "exposition of ideas" reflects
a curiously narrow and cerebral approach to the concept of expres-
sion. As a number of scholars have observed, ideas are not always
expressed in neatly articulated judicial, scholarly, or journalistic prose;
the intellectual, intuitive, and emotional components of the cognitive
process cannot be easily separated. 54 Readers' and viewers' re-
152. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; see also Di Bona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1348,
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990) (quoting this passage in Cohen); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 44-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting):
The idea that the First Amendment permits government to ban publications that
are "offensive" to some people puts an ominous gloss on freedom of the press....
The First Amendment was not fashioned as a vehicle for dispensing tranquilizers
to the people. Its prime function was to keep debate open to "offensive" as well
as "staid" people.... The use of the standard "offensive" gives authority to gov-
ernment that cuts the very vitals out of the First Amendment.
David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 111, 142 (1994) (explaining that ordinarily the "offensive" character of expres-
sion entitles it to greater, not lesser, constitutional solicitude).
153. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); cases cited supra note 133; ACT
III, supra note 133, at 677-82 (Edwards, J., dissenting); John Crigler & William Byrnes,
Decency Redux: The Curious History of the New FCC Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38
CAm. U. L. REv. 329 (1989) (criticizing FCC indecency regulation); Lili Levi, The Hard
Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 49 (1992-93) (analyzing
various meanings of "indecency" and tracing inconsistency of FCC enforcement).
154. See Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989
DuKE L.J. 420,423-24 ("Cognitive capacities include visual and other sorts of sensory per-
ception, along with linguistic ways of understanding.... All perception and thought aid in
our comprehension of the world; the notion that some of these are 'non-cognitive' because
they are not 'intellectual' is almost an incoherent distinction."); Cole, supra note 152, at
126:
[T]he argument that sexual speech is "noncognitive" because it is designed to
produce a physical effect is predicated on an impoverished view of sexuality. The
argument implies that at base, sex is purely physical. But sex cannot be stripped
of its expressive elements: "Sexuality is as much about words, images, ritual and
fantasy as it is about the body: the way we think about sex fashions the way we
live it."
(quoting JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALrrY AND ITS DiscoNTENTS: MEANINGS, MYrTHS, AND
MODERN SEXUALITIES 3 (1985)); Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Reg-
ulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1564, 1586-94 (1988) (contesting
view that pornography can be likened to a sex aid with no expressive or cognitive content);
Robert Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy and the First
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sponses to pornography, as to other highly charged ideas and images,
do involve mental processing.
Furthermore, the First Amendment embraces creative expres-
sion, both lowbrow and high;' 55 it embraces musical expression de-
spite its absence of words.' 6 Musical ideas, visual ideas, and sensual
and sexual ideas are all within the "freedom of speech," regardless of
a pundit's ability to articulate or deconstruct their "message." Judge
Easterbrook made this point in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hud-
nut,157 observing that not only pornography, but "almost all cultural
stimuli provoke unconscious responses."' 58
Numerous other ideas are found in speech about sex, whether or
not it approaches the legal boundaries of obscenity. As Gianni
Servodidio has observed, many artists "use pornographic images as a
filter through which [to] ... convey cathartic and painful emotions."' 59
Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 328 (1988) ("It is hard to understand how pornography
can communicate attitudes of disrespect toward women if it is entirely devoid of proposi-
tional, emotive, and artistic content .... ). But see Frederick Schauer, Speech and
"Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional
Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979) (describing pornography as merely a sexual aid essen-
tially without expressive content); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 795, 807-08 (1993) ("Many forms of pornography are not an appeal to the exchange
of ideas, political or otherwise; they operate as masturbatory aids and do not qualify for
top-tier First Amendment protection ... ").
155. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (describing the line be-
tween "informing" and "entertaining" as "too elusive" to be a basis for constitutional dis-
tinction); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("Entertainment, as
well as political and ideological speech, is protected . . ").
156. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a form of
expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment .... "); Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345 (1995) ("[A] nar-
row, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if
confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized message' would never reach the un-
questionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabber-
wocky verse of Lewis Carroll .... ") (citations omitted).
157. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.), affdmem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1985); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 190-92.
158. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 330.
159. Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devaluation of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form of Ex-
pression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1231, 1257-58 (1993) (giving as
examples R~n6 Magritte's painting Le Viol, which equates a woman's face with her sexual
organs; Egon Schiele's "grim, anatomatically studied portraits of his young subjects"; per-
formance artist Karen Finley's "deconstruct[ions of] conventional morality through actions
designed to degrade and offend"; and Vladimir Nabokov's "confront[ation of] the societal
taboos of incest and prepubescent sexuality" in Lolita).
Professor Lynn Hunt has demonstrated that until the nineteenth century, porno-
graphic material was deeply, subversively political, "linked to freethinking and heresy, to
science and natural philosophy, and to attacks on absolutist political authority." Lynn
Hunt, Introduction to THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: OBSCENITY AND THE ORIGINS
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Justice Brennan has noted that there are "ideas" both explicit and im-
plicit in pornography, among them the idea that anonymous or pro-
miscuous sex is legitimate and pleasurable: "[T]he speech suppressed
by restrictions such as those involved [here] will almost invariably
carry an implicit, if not explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sex-
ual mores. Such restrictions... have a potent viewpoint-differential
impact." 60
Beyond these expressive aspects of pornography itself, the sup-
pression of sexually transgressive ideas and images has historically
been driven by ideology. The United States' first comprehensive fed-
eral obscenity law, the Comstock Act of 1873, targeted not only sex
and nudity as subjects, but also the ideas of contraception, non-
procreative sex, free love, and anarchism.161 The same urge to sup-
press can be observed today when safer sex and contraceptive
information is conveyed explicitly, particularly to teen and gay audi-
ences, and particularly when it might be interpreted to encourage sex-
ual conduct. 62 As David Cole writes:
OF MODERNITY 1500-1800, at 9, 11 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1993). Hunt notes that even the 1986
Meese Commission on Pornography acknowledged that sexually explicit and arousing liter-
ature was originally censored in the name of religion and politics, not decency. See id. at
11-12. In the eighteenth century, Enlightenment philosophers embraced pornography be-
cause of their understanding that "sexual appetite was natural; repression of sexual appe-
tite was artificial and pointless; and the passions might have a beneficial influence in
making humans happy in this world." Id. at 34.
160. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 56 n.1 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Stone, supra note 5, at 111-12). Stone adds: "In our society, the very
presence of sexual explicitness in speech seems ideologically significant, without regard to
whatever other messages might be intended. To treat such restrictions as viewpoint-neu-
tral seems simply to ignore reality." Stone, supra note 5, at 112. See also Mark Yudof,
Library Book Selections and the Public SchooL The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59
IND. L.J. 527, 563 (1984) (questioning why excluding sexually oriented books is "not as
much of an imposition of values" as excluding "a feminist, religious, or civil rights point of
view"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 570, 571 (1991) (plurality opinion) (acknowl-
edging that nude dancing conveys "erotic message" but asserting that nudity ban "simply
makes the message slightly less graphic").
161. See, e.g., NADINE STROssEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND
THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 225-28 (1995); ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR:
MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1992);
MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP
WARS 137-64 (1993); Rabban, supra note 125, at 55-70; Feminist Anti-Censorship Task
Force Amicus Curiae Brief, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir.), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1985), reprinted in 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 69 (Fall
1987-Winter 1988).
162. See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 1994) (noting censorship of "sexual humor addressed to men's bodies" while con-
ventional display of female flesh is not considered controversial; see infra text accompany-
ing notes 262-67); Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278,280,296 (S.D.N.Y.
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[T]he political significance of sexual expression is revealed every
day. Sexuality and its expression have become heated political
issues in virtually every arena, from local school board disputes
over sex education, to state anti-gay legislative efforts, to con-
servative and feminist attempts to regulate pornography, to at-
tacks on artists who use sexual themes in their work, to debates
over "family values" in national presidential campaigns. 63
Second-class constitutional status for sexual or "vulgar" speech
has been particularly striking in public education cases. In the 1960s
and 1970s courts sometimes invalidated school curriculum choices and
library censorship decisions predicated on objections to "vulgar" con-
tent."6 However, by the 1980s the Supreme Court was approving
such decisions on the ground that school officials could reasonably
conclude that sex and vulgarity are simply taboo subjects or styles for
the young. For example, in Board of Education v. Pico,165 a case gen-
1992) (striking down condition of government grant for safer sex education that prohibited
any materials that were "offensive to a majority of the intended audience").
A striking instance of the viewpoint-driven use of obscenity laws occurred in 1994 in
Cincinnati, Ohio, when police brought charges against the city's only gay and lesbian book-
store, the Pink Pyramid, for renting the film Sai6 by the noted Italian director Pier Paolo
Pasolini. The police had sent an undercover vice squad officer into the store precisely to
find "sexually oriented" videos that might be prosecuted. "[T]he first selections were evi-
dently not explicit enough, so he returned, asking for something 'stronger' and 'more
graphic'[; o]n this second occasion, a clerk rented him Sal6," a grueling political allegory
that treats sexual sadism as a metaphor for fascism. How Prosecutors Are Using Obscenity
Laws to Stifle Dissent, ARTS CENSORSHIP PROJ. NEWSLETTER (ACLU/Arts Censorship
Proj. Newsletter, New York, N.Y.), Summer/Fall 1995, at 1. At the time of the arrests, the
city was about to go to trial in federal court to defend an anti-gay rights referendum that
the voters had passed in 1993, voiding that portion of the city's human rights ordinance
that barred discrimination based on sexual orientation. See id; Equality Found. v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
Eventually, a plea bargain to one count of "pandering" was negotiated and the remaining
charges against the store were dropped. Kristen Delguzzi, Pyramid Case Settled, CINCIN-
NATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 3, 1996, at AOL.
Cincinnati was also the town that prosecuted a museum and its director for obscenity
in connection with an exhibit by Robert Mapplethorpe that included some homoerotic
photographs. See Contemporary Arts Ctr. v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Ohio 1990). The
defendants were eventually acquitted. See Isabel Wilkerson, Cincinnati Jury Acquits Mu-
seum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 6, 1990, § 1, at 1.
163. See Cole, supra note 152, at 122-23 (citations omitted); see also, eg., PLEASURE
AND DANGER (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984); POWERS OF DESIRE: THE PoLrIcs OF SEXUAL-
rr' (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983); F.A.C.T. BOOK CoMMrrEE, CAUGHT LOOKING: FEMI-
NISM, PORNOGRAPHY, AND CENSORSHIP (1992). In 1994 the New Museum of
Contemporary Art in New York City presented a "Bad Girls" exhibit that highlighted the
politics of female sexuality as a theme in contemporary art.
164. See e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976);
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978); Sheck
v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982).
165. 457 U.S. 853 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 346-62.
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erally considered a First Amendment victory, the Supreme Court an-
nounced that viewpoint discrimination in decisions regarding removal
of school library books would be unconstitutional, but noted, on the
other hand, that the plaintiffs had "implicitly concede[d] that an un-
constitutional motivation would not be demonstrated if it were shown
that [defendarnts] had decided to remove the books at issue because
[they] were pervasively vulgar."'1 66
Four years later in Bethel School District v. Fraser,67 the Court
rejected a student's First Amendment challenge to punishment he re-
ceived for making a sophomoric speech laced with phallic metaphor at
a school-sponsored assembly. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the
Court approved broad public school authority to censor "vulgar" ex-
pression in the interests of teaching the value of "civil[ity],"'1 68 and
specifically noted that "the penalties imposed in this case were unre-
lated to any political viewpoint.' 69 The opinion expressed outrage at
Fraser's crude innuendos, and special concern for the tender sensibili-
ties of female students: "The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's
speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students-indeed to
any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal con-
tent, the speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students.'17 0
Chief Justice Burger cited no basis for his assumption that teenage
girls, as a class, are offended and harmed by phallic jokes.' 7'
Suppression of sexual or "vulgar" ideas in public education ad-
vanced another step with Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,72
which granted administrators broad power to control student speech
in the curriculum context, defining curriculum broadly to include
school-sponsored publications if connected to an academic class.173 It
was in reliance on Hazelwood that the Eleventh Circuit in Virgil v.
166. Id- at 871 (plurality opinion).
167. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
168. Id. at 681-83.
169. Id. at 685.
170. Id. at 683. Justice Burger added: "The speech could well be seriously damaging to
its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of
awareness of human sexuality." Id. No authority was cited for the assertion that sexual
innuendo "could well be seriously damaging" to young people.
171. As Justice Stevens pointed out, Matthew Fraser "was probably in a better position
to determine whether an audience composed of 600 of his contemporaries would be of-
fended by the use of a four-letter word-or a sexual metaphor-than is a group of judges
who are at least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the crime." Id. at
692 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see infra text accompanying notes 364-68.
173. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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School Board74 reluctantly upheld a school board's power to remove
an anthology containing two literary classics' 75 from an upper-level
literature course because of "'legitimate pedagogical concerns"' about
the sexual and vulgar content in both works. 7 6 The court of appeals
"seriously question[ed] how young persons just below the age of ma-
jority can be harmed by these masterpieces of Western literature,' 177
but said that under Hazelwood, the removal was not
unconstitutional. 78
Fraser and Hazelwood were decisions about public officials' con-
trol over school-sponsored activities, but in 1992 the Ninth Circuit in-
terpreted them to broaden school authorities' power to censor even
independent speech by students, if it was deemed "vulgar.' 79 In
1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District'80
had held that administrators could not censor independent student
speech unless it created a specific likelihood of "material interrup-
tion" of the school environment.'' But in Chandler v. McMinnville
School District,182 the Ninth Circuit read the Supreme Court's more
recent decision in Fraser to permit the punishment of "vulgar" in-
dependent student speech, regardless of whether any disruption en-
sued or was likely.18 3
Student plaintiffs in a 1993 dress code case vigorously challenged
Chandler's broad interpretation of Fraser. In Pyle v. South Hadley
174. 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
175. Id. at 1519 (describing the works as "English translations of Lysistrata, written by
the Greek dramatist Aristophanes in approximately 411 B.C., and The Miller's Tale, writ-
ten by the English poet Geoffrey Chaucer around 1380-1390 A.D.").
176. Id. at 1521-23. The record contained evidence of viewpoint discrimination-objec-
tions to "promotion of women's lib" (presumably Lysistrata), and references to using
"God's name ... in vain," id. at 1522 n.6, but the court deemed the plaintiffs to have
stipulated away the viewpoint discrimination issue, see id. at 1522, 1523 n.7; see also CLAU-
DIA JOHNSON, STIFLED LAUGHTER (1994) (relating one plaintiff's story of the Virgil case).
177. 862 F.2d at 1525.
178. See also Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719 (2d
Cir. 1994) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to school district's decision to bar volun-
teer instructor from classrooms because he had used sexually inappropriate materials).
179. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
180. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
181. Id. at 511.
182. 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 527. Because the student speech in Chandler (buttons supporting a teachers'
strike and using the word "scab") was not vulgar in the court's view, Tinker, not Fraser,
applied, and the principal's order to remove the buttons was held unconstitutional. See
also, Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
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School Committee,184 a district court struck down a viewpoint-based
portion of a school's dress code prohibiting message clothing that
"'harasses, intimidates, or demeans an individual or group of individu-
als because of sex, color, race, religion, handicap, national origin or
sexual orientation."" 8  Relying on Chandler, however, the district
court upheld part of the policy that banned "vulgar" or "profane" lan-
guage or images. 86 The court was persuaded that Fraser permitted
administrators this latitude. Plaintiffs, on appeal, argued that Fraser's
permissive standard for censorship of students' "vulgar" speech only
applied to school-sponsored activities.'87 They also argued that stan-
dards such as "vulgarity" are impermissibly vague and viewpoint-
based, reflecting patriarchal attitudes and prejudice against words
used by society's less elite classes:
[T]he court should recognize that most vulgarity censorship is
neither benign nor apolitical. Indeed, much of what passes for
"refined," as opposed to "vulgar," language turns out on closer
184. 824 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993) (denying preliminary injunction), 861 F. Supp. 157
(D. Mass. 1994) (granting final judgment), 55 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995) (certifying questions
to Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court), 423 Mass. 283 (1996).
185. Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 162, 170-71 (quoting Memorandum from Paul R. Raymond,
Interim Principal, South Hadley High School, to Students, Faculty, Staff and Parents (April
29, 1993)).
186. See id. at 170. The T-shirt that started the controversy bore a legend reading
"Coed Naked Band. Do It To The Rhythm." Id. at 158. In their subsequent attempts to
discern the meaning of the dress code, the plaintiffs wore shirts that said, "Coed Naked
Civil Liberties. Do it to the Amendments" (not permitted); and "Coed Naked Gerbils.
Some People Will Censor Anything" (permitted). Id. at 162-63; see also Broussard v.
School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992) (upholding suspension for wearing New
Kids on the Block T-shirt saying "Drugs Suck" because "suck" might have sexual connota-
tion or be considered vulgar and offensive).
Some courts have upheld school dress codes not only where directed at assertedly
vulgar words or ideas, but also where administrators dislike particular non-"vulgar"
messages. See, e.g., Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994) (uphold-
ing ban on T-shirts with messages objecting to grades, racial bias, and certain school poli-
cies); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
(upholding ban on clothing identifying sports teams); McIntyre v. Bethel Sch., 804 F. Supp.
1415 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (upholding ban on clothing advertising alcohol); Gano v. School
Dist. No. 411, 674 F. Supp. 796 (D. Idaho 1987) (upholding ban on T-shirt depicting admin-
istrators intoxicated).
187. Hazelwood had explicitly limited Fraser to vulgar speech in the context of school-
sponsored events such as "an official school assembly" because "the school was entitled to
'disassociate itself' from the speech in a manner that would demonstrate to others that such
vulgarity is 'wholly inconsistent with the "fundamental values" of a public school educa-
tion."' Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266-67 (1988) (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986)); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688-89 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) ("Respondent's speech may well have been protected had he given it
in school but under different circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in
teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less weighty.").
examination to be laced with upper-class contempt for lower-
class modes of expression, and with disdain for "peasants" and
disfavored racial or ethnic groups....
Indeed, there is no more virulent form of viewpoint dis-
crimination than vulgarity censorship intended to protect the so-
called "weaker sex," for it has the effect (and often the purpose)
of confining women to domestic roles and in linguistic ghettos
that have historically deprived them of economic and intellec-
tual opportunities. "Good taste" has little to do with taste, but
much to do with enforcing stereotypic sex roles, including
preventing females from being sexually forward, or from consid-
ering human sexuality humorous.' 8
The relevance of these observations to Chief Justice Burger's opinion
for the Court in Fraser89 is evident.
Paternalistic concern for female sensibilities is in fact a familiar
viewpoint-based aspect of censorship in the sexual realm. The rumi-
nations of Chief Justice Burger in Fraser are but one example. An-
other is found in the efforts of antipornography activists Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin to outlaw sexual speech that they
consider degrading to'women. Here, in contrast to obscenity and in-
decency law generally, the courts have not had trouble discerning
viewpoint discrimination. In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hud-
nut,'90 the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion a circuit court rul-
ing that the "MacKinnon/Dworkin" model antipornography
ordinance, as enacted by the City of Indianapolis, was unconstitution-
ally viewpoint-based because it singled out for suppression sexual ma-
terial with a message "subordinating" to women. Judge Easterbrook
explained for the Seventh Circuit: "The state may not ordain pre-
ferred viewpoints in this way.... Any other answer leaves the govern-
ment in control of all of the institutions of culture, the great censor
and director of which thoughts are good for us."'19
188. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants on a Question Certified from the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit at 32-34, Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 423 Mass. 283 (1996).
Without reaching these issues, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a state
student free speech law prohibited administrators from banning the T-shirts unless they
could meet the Tinker likelihood-of-disruption standard. See Pyle, 423 Mass. at 286-87; see
also Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 533 (9th Cir. 1992) (Goodwin, J.,
concurring) (objecting to "mischievous notion that there exists a subclass of words that are
'inherently disruptive.'.. .The invention of such a category would invite future courts and
litigants to circumvent the Tinker analysis. I doubt that it would be either workable or
desirable for judges to construct a list of words that one cannot say in school.").
189. See supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
190. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.), af'd men., 475 U.S. 1001 (1985).
191. Id at 325, 330. The Indianapolis ordinance was also unconstitutional because it
targeted expression with serious literary, artistic, or other value, in violation of Miller. Id
at 325, 331; see also Stone, supra note 106, at 461 (commenting on Hudnut).
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Judge Easterbrook's point is well-taken, but it reaches beyond
the MacKinnon/Dworkin type of ordinance. The First Amendment
does not allow the government to dictate "which thoughts are good
for us," whether it be in the guise of "feminist" antipornography laws,
indecency laws that turn on notions of "patent offensiveness," or ob-
scenity laws of the type upheld in Miller and Slaton because of the
lascivious, family-undermining, personality-distorting, and generally
immoral thoughts that the Court felt pornography inspires. As Pro-
fessor MacKinnon herself pointed out: "Why aren't obscenity and
child pornography laws viewpoint laws? Obscenity, as Justice Bren-
nan pointed out, ... expresses a viewpoint: sexual mores should be
more relaxed .... When do you see a viewpoint as a viewpoint? When
you don't agree with it. When is a viewpoint not a viewpoint? When
it's yours."' 92
i. Government Benefits and Property
Application of the viewpoint neutrality principle is particularly
important in the realm of government benefits and property, where so
much citizen speech takes place. Government officials' and courts'
notions of what is appropriate in subsidy programs or in granting ac-
cess to a particular public space often determine, as a practical matter,
what citizen speech will be allowed at all.' 93 Because government
benefit and subsidy programs are so pervasive, discrimination in these
areas-whether against an explicitly identified viewpoint, or more
generally against speech that is deemed "political," "controversial," or
"offensive"-is likely to have grave ramifications for the health of the
First Amendment. If the government were able to control speech in
programs for which it provides some support, "the result would be an
invitation to government censorship wherever public funds flow," and
"an enormous threat to the First Amendment rights of American citi-
zens and to a free society."' 94
As the Supreme Court explained in early cases like Douds and
Speiser, 95 depriving individuals of government benefits because of
their exercise of free speech establishes an "unconstitutional condi-
192. CATHARiNE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 212 (1987).
193. As one district court perceived: "[F]ew large-scale endeavors are today not sup-
ported, directly or indirectly, by government funds." Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ.
v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 478 (D.D.C. 1991) (striking down medical research grant
requirement that recipients not discuss their preliminary findings).
194. IE
195. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
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tion.' '1 96 Access to even nonpublic fora and nonentitlement programs
cannot be conditioned on the viewpoint of citizens' speech.' 97 The
Supreme Court in Rosenberger'98 reaffirmed the rule as applied to
subsidy programs and distinguished Rust v. Sullivan, which had caused
considerable consternation about the fate of viewpoint neutrality in
the funding context, as a case concerned only with the government's
speech.199
Thus, courts have generally invalidated viewpoint-based restric-
tions or overly vague standards that limit access to government prop-
erty or benefits. One Ninth Circuit decision, for example, invalidated
an official preference for "proper community values" or "family en-
tertainment" in the terms of private access to public facilities. 20 0 An-
196. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972) ("[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit ....
[government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitution-
ally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech."). For representa-
tive applications of this principle, see Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d
361,366 (8th Cir. 1988), invalidating a public university's denial of student activity funding
to a gay group on viewpoint discrimination grounds; Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d
1015, 1031 (2d Cir. 1985), finding officials' decisions to deny prisoners access to a report on
facility conditions was impermissibly based on views in the report; and Haitian Centers.
Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1036, 1040-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), holding that a
refusal to allow attorneys to interview imprisoned refugees was unconstitutional because
the refusal was based "solely on the content of what they had to say and the viewpoint they
would express."
198. 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2519 (1995) (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498
(1959); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)); see supra text accom-
panying notes 112-19.
199. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
200. Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560,568,573-77 (9th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985) (invalidating City's refusal to permit rock 'n' roll concerts at
municipal ampitheater in part because of some officials' objections to rock groups' "partic-
ular ideology or way of life," and in part because officials' stated preference was "guided
only by subjective, amorphous standards," leading to "the unbridled discretion over ex-
pression that is condemned by the First Amendment"); see also Finley v. National Endow-
ment for the Arts, No. 92-56028, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28837, *2, *14-23, *25-31 (9th Cir.
Nov. 5, 1996) (holding that "decency" and "respect" requirements for federal arts funding
were unconstitutionally vague and viewpoint-based); Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (removing art poster criticizing Reagan Ad-
ministration from public forum display space violated First Amendment); Gay Lesbian
Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1548 (M.D. Ala.), appealpending, 96-6143 (11th
Cir. 1996) (banning public university funding for any group "that promotes a lifestyle or
actions prohibited by the sodomy and sexual misconduct laws" unconstitutionally discrimi-
nates based on viewpoint); Amato v. Wilentz, 753 F. Supp. 543, 557 (D.N.J. 1990), vacated
on other grounds, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding viewpoint discrimination in Chief
Justice's refusal to permit use of a county courthouse for filming The Bonfire of the Vanities
because the film might "erod[e] ... the confidence of blacks and other minorities in the
judicial system").
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other court said a decision to close down a public access cable
television channel would be viewpoint-based if motivated by hostility
to the racist message of a particular access programmer.20 '
But the answers to the First Amendment questions raised by re-
strictions on public facilities are rarely simple. May a public library,
for example, that selects and discards books on the basis of literary
value or level of community interest also remove them because of
their political, sexual, moral, or religious viewpoint? What about a
school library? What terms are acceptable for government grants to
artists, scholars, and scientific researchers? If the history of World
War II is a permissible content limitation on an academic research
grant, may the government also require that the resulting book or
monograph emphasize the crimes of Hitler? De-emphasize Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's refusal to bomb the rail lines to Auschwitz? What
guidelines, other than subject matter and artistic merit, are permissi-
ble for an art exhibit at a public building that is not deemed to have
opened itself as a "designated public forum" for art? No sexual ex-
plicitness? Nothing "controversial"? Nothing insulting to religious or
ethnic groups?
A controversy that arose in Fairfax County, Virginia in 1994 illus-
trated these dilemmas. The Fairfax County Arts Council's guidelines
for use of exhibit space in the county government building provided
that "[n]udes, weaponry, drug paraphernalia, and works which reflect
violence, religious scenes, political expression or unpatriotic subjects"
were not "acceptable subject matters. '202 As a result, in April 1994,
an administrator removed two innocuous artworks from display: one
depicted an adobe church, the other a man wearing a yarmulke and
reading from a prayer book. In the wake of embarrassing publicity,
the Arts Council undertook to revise its policy, but its new proposed
guidelines only exacerbated the First Amendment problems of con-
tent and viewpoint discrimination. Now, in addition to nudity and
drug paraphernalia, "illegal acts of violence, works proselytizing or
ridiculing a specific religion, partisan political expression or seditious
subject matter" would be excluded.2"3 The proposed changes were
presumably intended to narrow overly broad bans, but had the para-
201. See Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1353
(W.D. Mo. 1989).
202. Form Letter of Agreement from the Fairfax County Council of the Arts, Govern-
ment Center Exhibitions (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union Arts Censorship
Project).
203. See Na'ama Batya Lewin, Arts Council Bars Religion, WAsH. JEWISH NEWS, Apr.
21, 1994; Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Con-
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doxical result of making them more clearly viewpoint-based. For ex-
ample, the religious exclusion was now limited to "proselytizing or
ridiculing.' '204 It is not a sufficient defense of these guidelines that a
private museum could, in the exercise of its First Amendment rights,
establish viewpoint-based exclusions, because the government, unlike
private entities, is bound by the Constitution when it opens up a dis-
play area for citizens' speech.
In response to a complaint from the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") and the American Jewish Congress ("AJC"), metic-
ulously explaining the content and viewpoint discrimination problems
with the policy,20° an attorney for the Arts Council responded that
legal niceties were really beside the point; the county had no obliga-
tion to open its space for art, and preferred to avoid anything "contro-
versial. '20 6 He warned that any challenge to the guidelines "might
well jeopardize the entire program of exhibits at the Government
Center. ,207
If this response failed to grapple with the constitutional perplexi-
ties, it at least had the virtue of candor. The author was no doubt
correct that some government officials would terminate exhibit pro-
grams if not permitted to have content- and viewpoint-based restric-
tions. Indeed, in response to the ACLU and AJC's further suggestion
that uncensored exhibits would be politically feasible if county offi-
cials and the public were educated about the fact that citizen speech
on public property did not imply government endorsement of the
ideas and images conveyed, the Arts Council attorney suggested that
the ACLU and AJC were "being naive to the politics of Fairfax
County. '208 He continued, "[t]here are many conservative voters...
whom supervisors would prefer not to offend by opening up the gov-
ernment center to literally all art.... This truly is a political issue. "209
gress to the Fairfax County Arts Council (June 1, 1994) (on file with the American Civil
Liberties Union Arts Censorship Project).
204. See supra text accompanying note 203.
205. See Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish
Congress to the Fairfax County Arts Council, supra note 203.
206. Letter from Douglas J. Sanderson to the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Jewish Congress (June 10, 1994) (on file with American Civil Liberties Union
Arts Censorship Project).
207. Id
208. Letter from Douglas J. Sanderson to Kent Willis, Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union of Virginia (July 22, 1994) (on file with the American Civil Liberties
Union Arts Censorship Project).
209. Id In the spring of 1995, according to the Arts Council's attorney, the county
officials were nonetheless persuaded that the guidelines were unnecessary, and they were
Fall 19961
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
If the Fairfax County situation was paradigmatic, numerous other
controversies over art exhibits have tested the limits of both content
neutrality requirements for public fora and viewpoint neutrality re-
quirements for nonpublic fora. In 1992, for example, New York artist
Robin Bellospirito was invited to contribute to an art exhibit in the
community room at the Manhasset, New York public library; she was
later disinvited, however, because her works depicted human nudes in
violation of an alleged, but unwritten, library policy.210 The images
were semi-abstract, murky, and nonsexual, but were discernibly
nudes.211 A federal court ruled that the library had created a limited
public forum in its community room for art, and that therefore the
disinvitation, being content-based, violated Bellospirito's First
Amendment rights.212
The court's public forum conclusion was dubious on the facts
presented, since the library had reserved to itself, or its delegated cu-
rator, substantial authority to make selections based on content, in-
cluding artistic merit.213 The real question in Bellospirito was whether
"nudity" as a content-based exclusion was permissible, as clearly
"merit" was.
The "nudity" exclusion could have been seen as viewpoint-
based-that is, driven by moral and ideological judgments and not by
any legitimate aesthetic concerns. 214 A finding of viewpoint discrimi-
nation, however, would have undermined the rest of the Bellospirito
court's analysis. For although the nudity in question here was "rela-
tively innocuous, '215 the court hastened to add that the library could
have legitimately prohibited not only unprotected obscenity but con-
subsequently abandoned. Telephone Interview with Douglas J. Sanderson, Attorney,
Fairfax County Arts Council (Oct. 12, 1995).
210. Bellospirito v. Manhasset Pub. Library, Civ. No. 93-CV-4484 (E.D.N.Y. July 31,
1994) (memorandum and order).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 13-15.
213. The court relied for its public forum analysis on Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), see supra text accompanying notes 110-11, and Kreimer v.
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261 (3d Cir. 1992). But Lamb's Chapel involved the very
different setting of first come-first served access to a public school facility, and Kreimer
found a library was a public forum for purposes of access by individuals, not selection of
artworks (or books). See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (holding that a
library is public forum for purposes of access to reading rooms).
214. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, No. 92-56028, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28837 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996); American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F.
Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1986); supra note 148.
215. Bellospirito, slip op. at 17.
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stitutionally protected "sexually explicit" art.2 16 This was, the court
said, because "sexually explicit" speech "does not enjoy comprehen-
sive First Amendment protection and 'the State may legitimately use
the content of [such] materials as the basis for placing them in a differ-
ent classification' from other speech. '2 1 7 The court's conclusion here
was questionable, if the community room did indeed have limited
public forum status, unless one accepts the proposition that sexually
explicit, but not obscene speech, has such limited First Amendment
protection that it can be excluded from public fora.218 A more coher-
ent analysis, and one more sensitive to First Amendment principles
protecting controversial and potentially offensive speech, might have
posited that the community room was not a public forum, but that the
revocation of the invitation to Bellospirito was "unreasonable,2 1 9
whereas a ban on highly graphic sexual material would be "reason-
able" in view of the forum's nature and purposes.22°
A case with a result dramatically less favorable to controversial
art than Bellospirito was Claudio v. United States,2 ' in which a North
Carolina federal court upheld the revocation of a permit to display a
painting pursuant to the Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act.222
This statute was explicitly designed to open appropriate federal prop-
216. kL
217. lI at 18 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71
(1976)).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 132-41 (describing lenient scrutiny often given
to regulation of nonobscene sexually oriented speech or entertainment).
219. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(stating that restrictions in nonpublic forum must be reasonable as well as viewpoint-neu-
tral); Perry Edue. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); supra text
accompanying notes 69-75. Alternatively, the court might have determined the case did
not turn on the nature of the forum.
220. In a similar case in Austin, Texas, a federal magistrate whose recommendations the
district court adopted found that the city had created a public forum for art in its municipal
building, and thus acted unconstitutionally when it barred exhibition of a classic male nude
on the ground that some viewers might be offended. See Swim v. City of Austin, Civ. No.
A-93-CA-648-JRN (W.D. Tex. July 17, 1995) (interim report and recommendation), rev'd,
No. 96-50160 (5th Cir. Dec. 18, 1996). Although terming the case "extremely difficult," the
court rejected the city's arguments that it was entitled to remove the artwork because of
fears that it would "cause controversy," or because the city had "a compelling state interest
in regulating the exposure of minors to sensitive material." Id., slip op. at 11-13 (relying on
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)). The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding
that no probable forum had been established.
221. 836 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (granting qualified immunity to individual de-
fendants); 836 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (granting summary judgment), affd mem., 28
F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994).
222. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 490, 601a, 606,611,612a (1986); see also 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-20.401-
.403 (1986) (Federal Property Management Regulations).
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erty to expressive activities on a content-neutral, first come-first
served basis. The reasons given for the removal were that the painting
was "political" and "controversial." 223 The district court found that
no public forum had been created, despite the clear terms of the fed-
eral statute, and that no viewpoint discrimination, but only permissi-
ble content discrimination, had occurred.22
The district court judge in Claudio evidently disliked the painting
as much as the governmental officials who removed it, for his decision
described the work as "a visual horror" that was "vulgar and inappro-
priate." 5 There was little doubt that gut judgments that the piece
was inappropriate for the lobby of a federal building drove both the
public forum and viewpoint discrimination rulings. 6
In 1995, the Second Circuit also refused to find viewpoint bias in
the revocation of a permit to show a politically controversial, but not
sexual, work at a particularly prominent location in New York City's
Pennsylvania Station-a large, illuminated billboard known as the
223. Claudio, 836 F. Supp. at 1222. Entitled Sex, Laws & Coathangers, Claudio's paint-
ing featured a large semi-nude woman and a three-dimensional replica of a bloody fetus.
See id.
224. See id, The court ignored not only arguments that such terms as "political" and
"controversial" betrayed a desire to suppress unpalatable ideas, but explicit evidence of
viewpoint bias: one witness testified that the painting had been removed because it might
have offended North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms. See Deposition of Peter Leonard,
Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.N.C. 1993), (No. 92-495-Civ-5-F); Record
App. at 756, 765-67, 824-25 (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union Arts Censor-
ship Project)).
225. Claudio, 836 F. Supp. at 1232, 1236.
226. See also Serra v. General Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1988) (up-
holding removal of sculptor Richard Serra's Tilted Arc from public plaza because of its
"unsuitable physical characteristics" and "unfavorable assessment of its aesthetic appeal,"
and because there was no evidence of an "impermissible condemnation of political view-
point"); Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir.) (upholding
public college's removal of racially and sexually provocative stained glass windows done in
the style of Aubrey Beardsley to less visible exhibit space because original space was not a
public forum, because the work had no particular social or political message that college
officials wished to suppress, and because original location gave officials legitimate reason
to worry about offending passers-by, especially since this was a community "in which Au-
brey Beardsley is not a household word"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985); Advocates for
the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 798 & n.8 (1st Cir. 1976) (rejecting constitutional chal-
lenge to arts agency's decision not to fund literary magazine containing vulgar language
and imagery); Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir.) (finding that visual art, re-
moved from college exhibit space, had only "minimal" First Amendment protection), cert
denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970); Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(holding that the removal of sculpture from public forum for political reasons violated First
Amendment).
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"Spectacular. '"227 The district court had ruled that the asserted policy
of the Amtrak officials who managed Penn Station, of prohibiting any
"noncommercial" ads, was applied in an impermissibly viewpoint-dis-
criminatory manner.228 The policy was also potentially "void because
of discrimination based on viewpoint," since it gave Amtrak discretion
to refuse any advertising "involving 'views which could result in dis-
sension . .. , complaints or controversy with its patrons or thepublic.,,,1229
After a reversal on "state action" grounds, 230 and another rever-
sal and remand by the Supreme Court,231 the Second Circuit reached
the First Amendment issue.232 It disagreed with the district judge on
every substantive point.233 The court of appeals first upheld the revo-
cation of Lebron's permit based on Amtrak's "undisputed practice
with respect to the Spectacular" of limiting displays to "purely com-
mercial advertising. "234 The Second Circuit said such a policy was rea-
sonable and viewpoint-neutral under the Supreme Court's 1974
decision in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights:235
Amtrak's position as a government controlled and financed
public facility, used daily by thousands of people, made it highly
advisable to avoid the criticism and the embarrassments of al-
lowing any display seeming to favor any political view. This was
particularly so with respect to the Spectacular in view of its uni-
queness and size. 36
227. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2537 (1996). The satirical work graphically deplored the Coors Beer
Company's support of the Nicaraguan Contras.
228. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 811 F. Supp. 993
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 115
S. Ct. 961, decision on remand, 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2537
(1996).
229. Lebron, 811 F. Supp. at 1004. According to one official, the policy banned "divi-
sive, controversial, or objectionable matter." Id. Elsewhere in Penn Station, Amtrak had
permitted political and public service displays, including ads for the New York Department
of the Environment, a foundation for muscular dystrophy, and the Worldwide Church of
God's magazine, The Plain Truth, which was replete with political commentary. Id at
1003-04. The district court also thought the policy unacceptably vague. Id. at 1001-03.
230. See Lebron, 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
231. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
232. See Lebron, 69 F.3d 650.
233. See id.
234. Id at 656.
235. 418 U.S. 298 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
236. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 658.
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The court then ruled that Lebron lacked standing to challenge the
vagueness or inconsistent application of the policy with respect to
other Penn Station display spaces.23 7
The Lebron court made no mention of Rosenberger and dis-
missed the plaintiff's viewpoint discrimination argument based on
Lamb's Chapel in a footnote. 38 Nor did the court reference the rec-
ognition in such cases as Consolidated Edison2 39 and League of Wo-
men Voters 4 ' of the dangers of restricting "political" or
"controversial" expression.2 41 Judge Newman's dissent protested:
Wholly apart from the absence of a clear, understandable, and
understood policy, Lebron might be correct that, to the extent
that the defendant's policy purports to bar political ads, it is a
viewpoint-based discrimination that violates the First Amend-
ment.... As Lebron contends, the defendants are willing to
display an ad urging the public to buy Coor's beer but are un-
willing to display his ad urging the public not to do so. He
makes a substantial argument that viewpoint-based discrimina-
tion is occurring when government allows an ad promoting the
sale of a product, but purports to prohibit an ad opposing a
product because of the views of its manufacturer. 242
Although Lebron's image was not sexually graphic, one suspects
that in addition to its solicitude for Amtrak's desire to avoid contro-
versy, the court of appeals was concerned about the implications of
forcing Amtrak to accept any advertising, no matter how "offensive,"
for the large and conspicuous Spectacular. The power of the particu-
lar medium to communicate with a large audience in this case seems
to have driven a result that further marginalized speech deemed un-
popular, provocative, or unusual. Further, the Second Circuit's reli-
ance on Lehman ignored the more recent precedent of
Rosenberger,2 43 with its frank recognition that public debate is not "bi-
polar" and that the silencing of "multiple voices"' is a form of view-
point discrimination.
237. See id. at 659-60.
238. See id. at 659 n.4. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
508 U.S. 384 (1993), held discrimination against "religious speech" to be viewpoint-based.
See supra text accompanying notes 110-19.
239. 447 U.S. 530 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 81-82, 90-92.
240. 468 U.S. 364 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
242. Lebron, 69 F.3d at 662-63 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
244. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
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In contrast to Lebron, Lehman was not controlling in Southwest
Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States,245 which
challenged the FAA's refusal to permit an advertisement in federally
owned airports because "it was political in nature and thus perceived
to be inconsistent with the government's interests in maintaining a
purely commercial and public service advertising medium.'' 246 The
court found that the advertising display areas at the airports involved
were designated public fora, so that even content discrimination was
prohibited.24 7 But the court also pointed out that banning certain
subjects from public discussion, while perhaps not presenting "the
same dangers as more specific, viewpoint-based prohibitions," does
have a "cost[ ] in First Amendment terms [that] should not be under-
stated. '248 In particular, a subject matter ban on "political" ads "im-
plicates one of the central purposes of the First Amendment:
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on matters of public af-
fairs. 2 49 Moreover, the FAA's policy "implicate[d] a second, related
concern-that [because the line between 'political' and 'commercial'
speech is sometimes hazy,] the [FAA's] policy operates in part to
screen out only controversial, but not noncontroversial, political
messages. 25 0 The ban thus had the potential "to operate as a sub
rosa penalty on presenting political viewpoints in 'controversial,' as
opposed to more benign 'commercial' forms."'25 1
The Ninth Circuit made the same point in Bullfrog Films, Inc. v.
Wick, 52 which struck down United States Information Agency
("USIA") regulations establishing eligibility criteria for certification
of "educational, scientific and cultural" audio-visual materials on First
Amendment and vagueness grounds. 53 The Agency's rules excluded
"religious, economic, or political propaganda" as well as materials that
"may lend [themselves] to misinterpretation, misrepresentation of the
United States or other countries, their peoples or institutions, or
which appear to have as their purpose or effect to attack or discredit
economic, religious, or political views or practices.' 254 The films de-
nied certification under these regulations dealt with environmental
245. 708 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
246. Id. at 761.
247. See id. at 763-68.
248. iL at 768.
249. lIt at 769 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
250. Id.
251. Id
252. 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988).
253. Id
254. Id at 505 (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(5)).
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and political issues, such as the U.S. involvement in Nicaragua, in a
manner evidently displeasing to the Agency.
While expressing doubt that the USIA's regulations were indeed
viewpoint-neutral, as the agency asserted,z 5 the court in Bullfrog
found it sufficient to invalidate the regulations as content-based, cit-
ing, inter alia, Consolidated Edison, Mosley, and League of Women
Voters. 56 "Regulations based on the political or controversial subject
matter of speech are particularly invidious," said the court, "for they
restrict public debate in that area most privileged by the First
Amendment. '2
5 7
In contrast to Bullfrog, the Eleventh Circuit in Ethredge v. HailP8
ruled that a military base rule against bumper stickers "or other simi-
lar paraphernalia" that "embarrass or disparage" the Commander-in-
Chief of the United States was viewpoint-neutral. 259 The court rea-
soned that not all signs criticizing the President would necessarily
"embarrass or disparage" him, while some signs praising the President
might well prove embarrassing-if, for example, they contained pro-
fane language.260 In its eagerness to allow what it perceived to be an
appropriately broad authority to censor speech at military facilities,
the circuit court ignored, among other things, the Supreme Court's
explanation in its flag desecration cases of why terms like "disparage"
or "desecrate" are inevitably viewpoint-based.261
Cases like Ethredge and Bullfrog demonstrate how the concepts
of content and viewpoint can be manipulated to reach what seem like
appropriate results. In Ethredge the court turned intellectual somer-
255. See id. at 509.
256. Id at 509-11; see supra text accompanying notes 61-62, 81-82, 90-101. In contrast
to the Supreme Court's contorted discussion of the issue in Boos, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 102-09, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that a policy discriminating against all
messages was not viewpoint-neutral because its effect was to "disapprove materials that
criticize and approve those that accept the prevailing state of affairs on a given topic." Id
at 510 n.11.
257. Id at 511.
258. 56 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1995).
259. Id
260. Id. at 1328.
261. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,316 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 410-18 (1989). But see Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435, 1444-45 (10th Cir. 1990) (find-
ing exclusion of pacifist leaflets from military base open house to be viewpoint-neutral
because Air Force barred all "organized dissemination of material advocating political or
ideological positions"), affd on rehearing, 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991); infra text accom-
panying note 285. Compare Bryant v. Secretary of the Army, 862 F. Supp. 574 (D.D.C.
1994), which held that a rule banning writings "not in consonance with policies of the
Department of the Army," in "personal commentary" section of military publications, was
unconstitutionally viewpoint-based.
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saults to avoid finding viewpoint discrimination and thus be able to
uphold the military's policy. In Bullfrog, the court shied away from
finding viewpoint discrimination in regulations that plainly discrimi-
nated based on the message that a particular film conveyed. Instead,
it invalidated the regulations as content-based even though some
types of content discrimination (e.g., restriction to neutrally defined
"educational" films) would likely be permissible under a certification
scheme like the USIA's.
If the Ethredge court blinked at clearly viewpoint discriminatory
language on the face of a general policy, in order to focus on specific
examples of how the policy might allow "nondisparaging" criticism of
the President, courts in two other cases delved beneath the generality
of an ostensibly viewpoint-neutral policy to find likely discrimination
in its application. The first, AIDS Action Committee v. Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority,2 62 found that a rule prohibiting sexually
"graphic" advertisements (including innuendo and double entendre)
was applied in a manner that "gave rise to an [unrebutted] appearance
of viewpoint discrimination. ' 263 The Massachusetts Bay Transporta-
tion Authority ("MBTA") had accepted heterosexually suggestive ads
for the film Fatal Instinct on its transit spaces, but rejected equally coy,
and considerably less graphic, homosexually oriented safer sex pos-
ters.2 4 In reaching its conclusion, the court refused to address the
question at the level of specificity urged by the agency-that is,
whether it was attempting to suppress the message that condoms are
effective in the fight against AIDS. Instead, the court said that, as in
R.A.V. v. St. Paul,2 65 where only fighting words with certain view-
points were punished, the MBTA's refusal to run the AIDS ads while
allowing the Fatal Instinct ads "constitute[d] content discrimination
which gives rise to an appearance of viewpoint discrimination. '266
The court insightfully opined that the AIDS ads may have been
screened more carefully because of the perception that they would
engender controversy; although
[t]he Fatal Instinct ads [were] more overtly sexual and more bla-
tantly exploitative, ... they represent[ed] the conventional ex-
ploitation of women's bodies for commercial advertising. The
262. 42 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
263. Id. at 7, 9-12.
264. See id.
265. 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
266. AIDS Action Comm., 42 F.3d at 11. The court also found the MBTA's policy to be
"scarcely coherent" and thus likely to "invite[ ] the very discrimination that occurred in
this case." Id at 12.
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condom ads, by contrast, represent[ed] sexual humor addressed
to men's bodies and-because of the connection to AIDS-
[were] also capable of provoking homophobic reactions from
the public, and did.267
In the second case, Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Department of Avia-
tion,268 the court strongly suggested that officials' refusal to permit
union ads critical of an airline to be displayed at O'Hare International
Airport was not just content- but viewpoint-based. 269  The city
claimed its ban on "political" ads was justified by a concern with not
alienating the "commercial interests" that use O'Hare.270 The court
found this argument "troubling" because its "degree of specificity" be-
trayed viewpoint concerns; that is, "[o]nly by reference to message
viewpoint (i.e., criticism of a major airline) is the City's objection ap-
parent."27 As in R.A.V., such selectivity "can 'create... the possibil-
ity that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular
ideas.' '12 72 The analogy to Boos v. Barry273 is apparent, but the Sev-
enth Circuit was more sensitive than the Supreme Court in Boos in
discerning why discrimination grounded in fear of controversy or ac-
quiescence to the demands or opinions of others is quintessentially
viewpoint-based.274
In Air Line Pilots, the Seventh Circuit remanded the issue of
whether the display cases at the airport were a designated public fo-
rum, and offered guidance to the district court on the viewpoint dis-
crimination question, should it be reached. 275 The court criticized as
"cursory" and "problematic" the district court's conclusion that the
ban on "political" ads was merely content-based 6 The "appropriate
focus for a viewpoint inquiry," said the court of appeals, is not the
"exaggerated level of generality" represented by the ban on political
ads, but "whether the proposed speech dealt with a subject that was
267. Id. at 12.
268. 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995).
269. Id. at 1157.
270. 1&
271. Id. The court made these comments in response to the city's argument that its
selectivity in assigning display spaces defeated plaintiffs' claim that the spaces constituted a
"public forum."
272. IdM (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992)).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09.
274. See supra note 106 (discussing acquiescence in viewpoint-discriminatory pressures
of others).
275. Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1158. If the display cases were a public forum, of course,
even the city's acknowledged content discrimination would have been unconstitutional. Id.
at 1151-58.
276. Id. at 1159.
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'otherwise permissible' in a given forum."2 7 7 As in Lamb's Chapel,
the important point was not that the government excluded all "reli-
gious" speech but that it banned religious perspectives on an other-
wise permitted subject.2 78 "A view labelled as 'political' (presumably
because it is controversial or challenges the status quo) may neverthe-
less exist in opposition to a view that has otherwise been included in a
forum." 279 Thus, broad categorical bans may have little to do with the
viewpoint inquiry in specific cases.280
The Air Line Pilots and AIDS Action Committee cases add
needed sophistication to the rule of viewpoint neutrality. Although
the courts did not say that all bans on "political," "controversial," or
"sexually graphic" speech are viewpoint-based, their focus on what
actually transpired in a given forum and whether the effect of the gov-
ernment's action was to block access to disfavored messages, helps
courts and litigators promote the underlying purpose of the viewpoint
neutrality rule-the free exchange of "controversial" and "offensive"
ideas. Moreover, the idea in Air Line Pilots and Southwest Africa that
bans on political speech potentially act "as a sub rosa penalty on
presenting political viewpoints in 'controversial,' as opposed to more
benign 'commercial' forns,"181 is critical to understanding how disfa-
vored ideas actually are suppressed under the guise of viewpoint neu-
trality. As one district court put it:
[T]he very terms "political" or "nonpartisan" are themselves in-
susceptible of principled application. Far too frequently the
mantle of nonpartisanship is thrown over the shoulders of those
who have been successful in obtaining political and economic
power . . . , while the pejorative of "political" is reserved for
those who have been less successful . . . . More obliquely
(although no less perniciously), the appellation of nonpartisan is
often affixed to ideas and values whose very emptiness of polit-
ical content may itself be considered an expression of political
277. Id. (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 393 (1993)).
278. Id.
279. Id. (citing AIDS Action Comm. v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 42 F.3d 10 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
280. In addition to the appearance of viewpoint discrimination, the Seventh Circuit
opined that a ban on political ads was not "reasonable," a requirement under Perry and
Cornelius for even nonpublic forums. AirLine Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1158-59 (citing Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Multimedia Pub. v. Greenville-
Spartanburg Airport, 991 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993)).
281. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d
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position. What is "political" and what is "nonpartisan" must of
necessity.., lie in the eyes of the beholder.
IV. Government Speech
Although viewpoint neutrality is critically important where the
government operates benefit or subsidy programs, or permits speech
by citizens on public property, its application to "government speech"
is more limited. To function, government must be able to express its
ideas and exhort its constituents. Whether operating a museum, hold-
ing a press conference, or urging the electorate to tighten its belt in
the face of economic realities, government may favor some viewpoints
and ideas over others. In these situations, government has not opened
a forum of any kind for citizen expression.
Thus, for example, decisions to exclude the Nazi viewpoint from
the Holocaust Museum, to confine a government-commissioned me-
morial sculpture to only patriotic sentiments, or to develop a revision-
ist historical viewpoint in an exhibit about the atom bomb,283 are not
unconstitutional because the government in power is speaking, and
there is no pretense that a forum has been created for diverse ideas, or
indeed for any speech by citizens.284 The primary remedy for mis-
guided decisions or distorted judgments in these situations may be the
282. Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 400 F. Supp. 1319,1326
(E.D. Wis. 1976) (holding that refusal to rent high school gymnasium for speech by Com-
munist Party member based on policy against use of school facilities for religious or polit-
ical activities unless nonpartisan or nondenominational was unconstitutionally content-
based).
283. Note that the First Amendment analysis may change where political pressures are
brought to bear against the original conception of the government curators; see infra text
accompanying notes 306-13.
284. See generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS-POLTICS, LAW,
AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983). See also Laurence Tribe, Toward a
Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U. L. REV. 237,244 (1978) ("Nor can an acceptable free
speech theory demand that government be an ideological eunuch; the theory must be sub-
tle enough to distinguish government as censor from government as speaker."); C. Edwin
Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 Sup.
CT. REV. 57, 86 ("The government selects what information to develop in government
studies, to foster with government research grants, and to publicize in government publica-
tions .... The Surgeon General advances the view that smoking is bad. The Defense De-
partment promotes enlistment, while other government agencies sometimes advocate
conservation."); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139
n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Government is not restrained by the First Amend-
ment from controlling its own expression.... As Professor Thomas Emerson has written,
'The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect private expression and nothing in the
guarantee precludes the government from controlling its own expression or that of its




democratic process of throwing out the current regime and electing
another. As the Tenth Circuit said in upholding the exclusion of cer-
tain political groups from an Air Force base open house:
[W]e would be reluctant to base a finding of viewpoint discrimi-
nation on the military's failure to permit plaintiffs to express
their opposition to any messages allegedly conveyed by the mili-
tary itself... Government speech would be unduly chilled if any
individual or group with views contrary to those of the govern-
ment were entitled to access to non-public governmental fora
for rebuttal. 8
Alas, or fortunately, life is not always so simple, even in the
sphere of government speech. The First Amendment applies when-
ever government acts; how the First Amendment applies is the ques-
tion to be answered in every case. Additionally, statutes creating
instrumentalities of government speech may themselves restrain
wholesale propagandizing or suppression of opposing views. 6 Thus,
as in other contexts, application of viewpoint neutrality to "govern-
ment speech" requires an inquiry into the type of expression and fo-
rum involved and the First Amendment values at stake.
The purest type of government speech includes propaganda,
press conferences, press releases, exhibits or symbols expressing the
government's views, agency reports on an array of issues from forest
fires to child abuse, and statements of opinion or exhortation by gov-
285. Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435, 1445 (10th Cir. 1990), affd on reh'g, 944 F.2d 732
(10th Cir. 1991).
286. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 41 (1996) (stating purpose of Smithsonian Institution is "the
increase and diffusion of knowledge among men"); id. § 76(j)(a) (mandating that John F.
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts shall "strive to ensure" that its programs "meet
the highest level of excellence and reflect the cultural diversity of the United States"); 22
U.S.C. § 1461-1 (stating that mission of United States Information Agency is to "further
the national interest by improving United States relations with other countries and peoples
through the broadest possible sharing of ideas, information, and educational and cultural
activities") (emphasis added); 22 U.S.C. § 1463 (1990) (mandating that Voice of America
be a "consistently reliable and authoritative source of news" which is "accurate, objective,
and comprehensive"); Gartner v. United States Info. Agency, 726 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (S.D.
Iowa 1989) ("Congress restricted the USIA's activities to the foreign sphere in order to
prevent the agency from propagandizing the American public."); Crowley v. Smithsonian
Inst., 636 F.2d 738,741-44 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting challenge by religious fundamentalist
to Smithsonian exhibit on evolution; exhibit did not go beyond the museum's statutory
purposes of scientific research and education, and did not impermissibly endorse "religion"
of secular humanism); see also Larry Rohter, With Voice of Cuban-Americans, a Would-Be
Successor to Castro, N.Y. TIMEs, May 8, 1995, at Al (describing political turmoil within
Radio Marti and apparent violations of statutory and regulatory fairness guidelines for
both content of broadcasts and treatment of staff).
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ernment officials.2 7 Government speech outlets like the United
States Information Agency are probably in this category. Thus, as the
Supreme Court said in Rust v. Sullivan, s8 "[w]hen Congress estab-
lished a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles,.., it was not constitution-
ally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of polit-
ical philosophy such as communism and fascism." 9
Similarly, in NAACP v. Hunt,2 90 the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
civil rights organization's constitutional challenge to the practice of
flying the Confederate flag over the state capitol.29' The Court ex-
plained that decisions like Mosley were simply not relevant to this
case of government, rather than citizen, speech: "[T]he state may re-
serve the dome for its own communicative purposes as long as that
reservation is reasonable and is not an effort to suppress expression
because the public officials oppose the speaker's view. '292 Here, the
court relied on the nonpublic forum analysis of Perry Education Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,z93 even though it is probably more
accurate to describe the situation in Hunt as involving no forum at all
for citizen speech. The court was closer to the mark analytically when
it said that "[g]overnment communication is legitimate as long as the
government does not abridge an individual's 'First Amendment right
to avoid becoming the courier for [its] message. '294
Hunt thus raises the question of when government exhortation
crosses the line to threats, intimidation, or coercion of citizen speech.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,2 95 the Court held unconstitutional
an informal censorship scheme in which a state commission sent let-
ters urging booksellers to drop titles that the commission considered
287. Some of these examples come from Mark G. Yudof, supra note 284, at 40; see also
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565 (1980); Linda L. Berger, Note,
Government-Owned Media: The Government as Speaker and Censor, 35 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 707 (1985).
288. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
289. Id at 194 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1994)); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2519 (1995) ("[T]he government [in Rust] did
not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to
transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. We recognized that when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is enti-
tled to say what it wishes.").
290. 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1566.
293. 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
294. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1566 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)).
295. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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harmful and implicitly threatened criminal prosecution if they did not
"cooperate. '296 In Penthouse International,'Ltd. v. Meese,297 by con-
trast, the D.C. Circuit distinguished Bantam Books and held that the
Meese Commission on Pornography's letters advising convenience
stores that they would be listed as purveyors of pornography unless
they stopped carrying such titles as Playboy and Penthouse, did not
violate clearly established law.298 That is, the court in Penthouse did
not think that the government speech at issue amounted to unlawful
threats or coercion.2 99 Short of such threats or coercion, government
officials are free to opine and exhort the citizenry on a range of issues,
from water pollution to drug abuse to nuclear disarmament to pornog-
raphy, without providing equal time to opposing views.
Government-commissioned artworks and exhibits in publicly
owned museums are similar to forms of government speech that take
place in non-fora. They are not designed for the exchange of views, or
indeed as subsidies or benefits for which rules of viewpoint neutrality
are appropriate. 300 Thus, in Serra v. United States General Service Ad-
ministration,30 1 the Second Circuit rejected artist Richard Serra's chal-
296. Id.
297. 939 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 950 (1992).
298. Id.
299. See id. at 1014-16. The decision was only about the defendants' "qualified immu-
nity" from damages liability, but the Court's language suggested that it thought no consti-
tutional rights had been violated; see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987)
(finding Congress's "neutral and evenhanded" use of the term "political propaganda" to
describe films that must be labeled as such for purposes of the Foreign Agents Registration
Act did not violate constitutional rights of filmmakers. The Court had "no occasion here
to decide the permissible scope of Congress' 'right to speak."' Id. Nor did it indicate
whether the First Amendment rights of the film's exhibitors would have been burdened if
the Court had understood the term "propaganda" to be pejorative.); American Jewish
Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 134 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
("[G]overnment may encourage what it may not compel.... [I]t may denounce what it
may not forbid."); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1313 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1021 (1986):
We know of no case in which the first amendment has been held to be implicated
by governmental action consisting of no more than governmental criticism of the
speech's content.... A rule excluding official praise or criticism of ideas would
lead to the strange conclusion that it is permissible for the government to prohibit
racial discrimination, but not to criticize racial bias; to criminalize polygamy, but
not to praise the monogamous family; to make war on Hitler's Germany, but not
to denounce Nazism.
300. This is not to say that a public museum could not devote space to an exhibit whose
content and ideas would be free of the government's curatorial control. When a museum
like the Smithsonian chooses to permit such a show, it has created a nonpublic forum and
the usual rules of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality should apply. See supra text
accompanying notes 69-75.
301. 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
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lenge to the removal of his government-owned and commissioned
sculpture, Tilted Arc, from its intended exhibition spot at the federal
courthouse plaza in Manhattan. °2 The court of appeals explained:
[T]he First Amendment has only limited application in a case
like the present one where the artistic expression belongs to the
Government rather than a private individual .... "[N]othing in
[the First Amendment] precludes the government from control-
ling its own expression or that of its agents."... Consequently,
the Government may advance or restrict its own speech in a
manner that would clearly be forbidden were it regulating the
speech of a private citizen.... Serra relinquished his own speech
rights in the sculpture when he voluntarily sold it to GSA .... 303
Having resolved the issue in this apparently straightforward man-
ner, the Serra court then threw a theoretical monkey wrench into the
analysis by suggesting that "there are conceivably situations in which
the Government's exercise of its discretion in this regard could violate
the First Amendment rights of the public," and that "it is ... possible
that the Government's broad discretion to dispose of its property
could be exercised in an impermissibly repressive partisan or political
manner."3°4 For these propositions, the court relied on the Supreme
Court's 1982 school library case, Board of Education v. Pico.30 5
Yet it is prudent to leave room, as the Serra court did, for the
possible application of viewpoint neutrality principles to some in-
stances of government speech. As in the public school situation, 0 6
there is a significant distinction between legitimately inculcating val-
ues or commissioning art with a particular message, on the one hand,
and responding to outside ideological pressures to censor or restrict
government-sponsored art or educational materials on the other.
302. d The reasons for removal were the work's large, awkward size, which interfered
with pedestrian use of the plaza, as well as complaints about roosting pigeons, safety, and
lack of aesthetic appeal, including the development of rust which the artist described as "a
golden amber patina." Il- at 1047; see supra note 226.
303. Id at 1048-49 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
at 139 (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Silvette v. Art Comm'n, 413 F. Supp. 1342, 1346
(E.D. Va. 1976) (rejecting claim by disappointed artist that state laws governing gifts of
artwork violated his First Amendment rights-laws simply "delineate the means by which
the Commonwealth may acquire works of art by purchase or otherwise," and involve "ar-
tistic judgment"). But see Barbara Hoffman, Law for Art's Sake in the Public Realm, 16
COLUm.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 39,70 (1991) (taking issue with Serra decision for not recogniz-
ing censorship potential where government "is not simply another property owner [and]
when the property in question is public art").
304. Serra, 847 F.2d at 1049, 1050.
305.' See id. at 1049 (citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)); see infra text
accompanying notes 346-55.
306. See infra discussion in Part V.
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Likewise, the government's power, through its own speech, to indoc-
trinate and "manufacture consent" is sufficiently overpowering that
room should be left for First Amendment claims when outside polit-
ical interference distorts professional, educational, or curatorial judg-
ments, and results in censorship. °7
One dramatic example of this phenomenon was the 1994 contro-
versy that erupted over the National Air and Space Museum's exhibit
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.0 8 The show, as planned by the museum's curators with
the assistance of professional historians, detailed President Truman's
decision to drop the two bombs, and raised questions about the mili-
tary necessity of doing so. The exhibit's less-than-unquestioning ap-
proach to Truman's decision incensed a number of veterans groups
and members of Congress. The resulting political pressures eventually
led to cancellation of virtually the entire show.309 As the Second Cir-
cuit said in Serra, government decisions about its own speech gener-
ally do not raise First Amendment concerns. 310 However, it is also
true, as the American Association of University Professors pointed
out:
[flf the Smithsonian's curators and administrators cannot exer-
cise their professional judgment about what to display and how,
then the way is open for outside groups to determine what are
objectionable or unobjectionable exhibitions. Cancellation of
an exhibition because some find it offensive increases the
probability that suppression will become an acceptable response
to controversial displays. 31'
307. Professor Yudof explains that some level of viewpoint neutrality in the public
school context is advisable because schools are "perhaps the government's most pervasive
and important exercise in communication[,]" with consequent potential for manufacturing
consent, indoctrinating, and controlling access to ideas. YUDOF, supra note 284, at 211.
Yudof argues that even where government is exercising an editorial function, ideological
overreaching should be limited by delegation to experts, such as teachers, museum direc-
tors, and editors. Id. at 243.
308. See MARTIN HARWrITr, AN EXHBrr DENIED-LOBBYING THE HISTORY OF ENOLA
GAY (1996); Eugene L. Meyer, No Peace for Enola Gay, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994, at C2;
Eric Schmitt, 80 Lawmakers Demand Ouster of Director of Air Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1995, at A6; Karen De Witt, U.S. Exhibit on 1945 B-29 Is in Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1995, §1, at 8; Karen DeWitt, Smithsonian Scales Back Exhibit of B-29 in Atomic Bomb
Attack, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 31, 1995, at Al.
309. See supra note 308; see also Ian Buruma, The War over the Bomb, N.Y. REv.
BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 26; The Smithsonian Institution and the Enola Gay Exhibit,
ACADEME, July-Aug. 1995, at 56 [hereinafter Enola Gay Exhibit]; Barton J. Bernstein,
Hiroshima, Rewritten, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at A21; John Kifner, Hiroshima: A Con-
troversy that Refused to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at A16.
310. See Serra, 847 F.2d at 1048-49.
311. Enola Gay Exhibit, supra note 309, at 56.
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That is, the robust exchange of controversial ideas so essential to
democracy and human freedom suffers regardless of whether the vet-
erans' and other political pressures are brought to bear against a gov-
ernment museum or a private one. And although government-created
exhibits, which constitute government speech, are very different from
art or other citizen expression that is simply government-funded or
assisted,312 the First Amendment concern with protecting "controver-
sial" and "offensive" viewpoints is not necessarily irrelevant in the
context of government speech.313
Another form of government speech, related to but also mark-
edly different from officially sponsored artworks or exhibits, is gov-
ernment-owned broadcasting stations.314 A number of cases have
addressed the First Amendment implications of viewpoint discrimina-
tion in this context. Analytically, these stations are generally not fora
of any type, yet they may act in ways that violate the First
Amendment.
A leading case is Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Com-
mission,315 an en banc decision in two consolidated actions that up-
held the cancellation of broadcasts of the controversial documentary
Death of a Princess.316 The broadcasts were cancelled in response to
political pressure from Saudi Arabia and from local residents "ex-
press[ing] fear for the personal safety and well-being of [American]
312. That is, government funding or other assistance is usually intended to foster citizen
speech, and does not imply government endorsement of the views expressed; see supra
Part III.
313. By 1995, closing government exhibits because of political pressure had become
almost routine. See, e.g., Irvin Molotsky, Freud Show Delayed Amid Criticism, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 6, 1995, at A18; Dinitia Smith, Ideas & Trends: Freud May be Dead, but His Critics
Still Kick, N.Y. Trmns, Dec. 10, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 14; Julia M. Klein, Post-
ponement of Freud Exhibit Raises Questions About Censorship, DALLAS MoRNING NEWS,
Dec. 25, 1995, at 16A (postponing of Library of Congress exhibit on Sigmund Freud under
pressure from anti-Freudians); Karen DeWitt, After Protests, Library of Congress Closes
Exhibit on Slavery, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1995, at A21 (relating objections voiced by Afri-
can-American library staff).
314. Not to be confused with nonprofit radio or television stations that simply receive
public funding via the Corporation for Public Broadcasting ("CPB"), and that are guaran-
teed editorial freedom in the CPB statute. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(3), (5) (1991) (stating
that purposes of Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 include "the expansion and development
of public telecommunications and of diversity in its programming, [which] depend on free-
dom, imagination, and initiative on both local and national levels," and responsiveness to
"the interests of people both in particular localities and throughout the United States,
which will constitute an expression of diversity and excellence, and which will constitute a
source of alternative telecommunications services").




citizens working in the Middle East if the program was shown. 3 17
The en bane court produced six separate opinions, but a majority
agreed that there was no First Amendment violation. 18 Judge Hill's
plurality opinion rejected both public and nonpublic forum analysis:
We are not convinced that editorial decisions of public television
stations owned and operated by the state must, or should, be
viewed in the same manner and subjected to the same restric-
tions as state regulatory activity affecting speech in other ar-
eas. . . . [T]he First Amendment does not prohibit the
government, itself, from speaking, nor require the government
to speak. Similarly, the First Amendment does not preclude the
government from exercising editorial control over its own me-
dium of expression.319
Thus, according to Judge Hill, viewpoint discrimination by gov-
ernment broadcasters, or acquiescence in outside ideological pres-
sures, is permissible. "In exercising their editorial discretion state
officials will unavoidably make programming decisions which can be
characterized as 'politically motivated.""'32 Judge Hill, rejecting a
proposed analogy to the Supreme Court's application of viewpoint
neutrality to library book removal in Pico, did not see a material dif-
ference between affirmative programming choices and decisions to
cancel shows because of their political content.3
2
'
The dissenters in Muir, by contrast, generally followed the rea-
soning of the Pico plurality and earlier education censorship cases, 32
distinguishing between legitimate affirmative programming decisions
and illegitimate viewpoint-based suppression of already-scheduled
shows.3 3 Judge Reavley would not have gone as far as some of the
other dissenters because he felt that government-operated television
stations should have the authority to make editorial decisions even
based upon political content, so long as they are not based "upon
317. Id. at 1036. See supra note 106 (regarding application of viewpoint neutrality prin-
ciples to decisions acquiescing in the ideological pressures of others).
318. See Muir, 688 F.2d at 1033.
319. Id. at 1043-44.
320. Il at 1044.
321. Id. at 1044-45; see infra text accompanying notes 346-55.
322. See, e.g., Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.), affd as modified en banc, 489
F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), and cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Muir, 688 F.2d at 1055-59 (Johnson et al., JJ., dissenting).
323. See Muir, 688 F.2d at 1053-60 (Johnson, Hatchett, Anderson, Tate, and Clark, JJ.,
dissenting) (Kravitch, JJ., dissenting).
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viewpoint alone,... entirely aside from any opinion as to program
value or effect." 324
Other cases involving government broadcasting have used non-
public forum analysis to uphold editorial decisions that are not clearly
viewpoint-based. 325 On the other hand, one court held that a govern-
ment radio station's censorship of its employees' broadcasts was view-
point-based and unconstitutional; the university-owned station had
opened itself to speech by volunteers and thus created a nonpublic
forum in which general editorial decisions were legitimate but view-
point discrimination was not.326
The bottom line seems to be that government-owned broadcast
stations have editorial discretion similar to that enjoyed by the private
media, but that, as in the public education context,327 the discretion is
not boundless. First Amendment viewpoint neutrality may be re-
quired in some circumstances, at least when the station has become a
nonpublic forum or even a limited public forum for speech by citizens,
and certainly when it is run by a public university in a manner similar
to other student activities. 32
As in other contexts, how First Amendment principles should ap-
ply to government speech depends in large part on the purposes and
functions of the forum or activity involved. The First Amendment
rights of the public are never irrelevant, even if the government is
speaking. Because so many different activities might be considered
324. Id. at 1060 (Reavley, J., dissenting). Similarly, a concurrence by Judges Rubin,
Politz, Randall, and Williams distinguished between the First Amendment requirements
when "the state is conducting an activity that functions as a marketplace of ideas," and
when "the state's activity is devoted to a specific function rather than general news dissem-
ination or free exposition of ideas." Id. at 1050.
325. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television, 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 1962 (1995) (holding that a minor political candidate has no right of access to
government-owned station to participate in election debate); Chandler v. Georgia Pub.
Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 489 (11th Cir. 1990) (adverting to nonpublic forum
analysis by noting that restriction was "content-based" but "not viewpoint restrictive");
Schneider v. Indian River Comm. College Found., 875 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding
that a radio station owned by a public university did not violate First Amendment rights of
employees who were fired for refusing to comply with editorial directive prohibiting re-
porting on certain subjects).
326. See Aldrich v. Knab, 858 F.Supp. 1480, 1492-94 (W.D. Wash. 1994). Aldrich distin-
guished Schneider, see supra note 325, because the ban in Aldrich on on-air criticism of the
station or the university was viewpoint-based. Cf. Bryant v. Secretary of the Army, 862 F.
Supp. 574,580-81,585 (D.D.C. 1994) (letters to editor column in military publication is not
"government speech," but is a nonpublic forum in which viewpoint discrimination is
impermissible).
327. See infra Part V.
328. Cf., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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government speech, including educational curriculum, museum exhib-
its, broadcasting, and even public library choices, the values underly-
ing viewpoint neutrality should in some circumstances limit the
government's ability to skew the debate and suppress disfavored ideas
or information.
V. Public Education: The Pico Paradox
Public education presents a paradoxical situation: it is govern-
ment speech for some purposes, yet also a quintessential forum for
intellectual growth, exploration, exposure to unconventional ideas,
and tolerance of dissenting views. School boards have the largely dis-
cretionary authority to mold curriculum in order to "inculcat[e] funda-
mental values, '329 yet students "may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."330
Public education is too important to abandon to political conformism
or doctrinaire ideology that would "strangle the free mind at its
source,"331 even though it is undoubtedly, for some purposes, a vehi-
cle for government speech.
The tension between these two competing visions and roles of
public education is reflected in the case law. Before Pico, some courts
invalidated school censorship decisions without sharply distinguishing
between content and viewpoint discrimination.332 Others made the
329. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
330. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,511 (1969) (invalidating prin-
cipal's suspension of students for refusing to remove black armbands protesting U.S. gov-
ernment's involvement in Vietnam). Because there was no evidence in Tinker that the
students' expressive conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," id. at 509, the principal's
order violated the First Amendment. The case involved government officials' attempt to
censor independent speech by students, not school-sponsored curriculum or library
choices.
331. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). As Mark
Yudof has written, free speech and thought are important in schools precisely because
public education is "perhaps the government's most pervasive and important exercise in
communication," with vast power to determine what information and ideas will be avail-
able to the young. YUDOF, supra note 284, at 211.
332. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976)
(invalidating removal of Joseph Heller's Catch 22 and Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle from
school library because board members found them "distasteful"); Sheck v. Baileyville Sch.
Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982) (invalidating removal of anthology of writings by
Vietnam veterans based on "objectionable language"); Loewen v. Tirnipseed, 488 F. Supp.
1138, 1139 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (striking down rejection of Mississippi history text on both
First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds; two officials thought the book treated
race in too controversial a manner); Dean v. Timpson Ind. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 308
(E.D. Tex. 1979) (invalidating teacher firing based on use of magazine survey which of-
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distinction, leaving only a narrow window for First Amendment
claims, or appeared to reject judicial intervention entirely.333 A repre-
sentative case was Cary v. Board of Education,3 4 where teachers un-
successfully challenged a school board's deletion of ten books from a
list of 1,285 recommended for elective language arts courses.335 The
Tenth Circuit, in upholding the deletions, distinguished between legiti-
mate decisions to ban books based on the board members' "personal
views" and decisions designed to "promote a particular religious view-
point" or based on a "systematic effort... to exclude any particular
type of thinking or book," which would be constitutionally
improper.3 3 6
Two years later, Seyfried v. Walton337 followed a different analyti-
cal route to the same judicially deferential goal. A school superinten-
dent stopped rehearsals for a student production of the play Pippin
after a parent complained that the play mocked religion. The Third
Circuit found that the superintendent's decision was actually based on
the work's "sexual content. '338 The court found no First Amendment
violation because the superintendent's decision did not involve "stu-
dent newspapers or other 'non-program related expressions of student
fended "the dominant views or beliefs" of the community); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ.,
469 F. Supp. 1269 (D. N.H. 1979) (invalidating removal of Ms. magazine from school li-
brary); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978)
(invalidating removal of poetry anthology considered vulgar from school library); Parducci
v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352,353-54 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (applying Tinker "substantial disrup-
tion" standard to invalidate teacher firing for use of Kurt Vonnegut story which administra-
tors viewed as "literary garbage" with whose "philosophy" they disagreed).
333. See, e.g., President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community Sch. Bd. No. 25,457 F.2d 289,
292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (rejecting challenge to library book removal
on grounds, inter alia, that school library is adjunct to curriculum); Minarcini v. Strongsville
City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d at 579-82 (holding that with respect to curriculum, as opposed to
library, decisions, school boards have broad authority; record did not disclose arbitrary or
capricious decisionmaking even though it reflected board's animosity to some books based
on their content).
334. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
335. Id
336. Id at 538, 544. Similarly, in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d
1300 (7th Cir. 1980), the Seventh Circuit agreed with a district court's dismissal of a curric-
ulum censorship case but gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to replead and allege partisan
viewpoint discrimination. The court said school boards may select instructional materials
"that will best transmit the basic values of the community," but may not "impos[e] 'a pall
of orthodoxy' on the offerings of the classroom," Ua at 1305-06 (quoting Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967)). Attempting further elucidation of this cloudy
distinction, the court said that student plaintiffs "must cross a relatively high threshold" in
pleading First Amendment curriculum censorship claims. Id. at 1306.
337. 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
338. Id at 215-16.
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opinion,' 339 and because the school had an "important interest in
hvoiding the impression that it has endorsed a viewpoint at variance
with its educational program."34° Seemingly, the court saw no risk of
imposing a "pall of orthodoxy" provided that student expression in-
dependent of the curriculum was not infringed upon.341
Judge Rosenn wrote separately in Seyfried "to emphasize that
[school authorities'] discretion is not unfettered and that courts have a
duty to vindicate the complementary constitutional rights of students
to express and to hear more than one point of view. '342 He noted the
"inherent tension between these two essential functions, on the one
hand exposing young minds to the clash of ideologies in the free mar-
ketplace of ideas, and on the other hand the need to provide our
youth with a solid foundation of basic, moral values. '343 Resolving the
tension, said Judge Rosenn, should involve an assessment of the ad-
ministrators' motivations in light of the nature of the material cen-
sored, particularly if the content is sexual, and the "intellectual and
emotional development of the students."'  Here, because the super-
intendent's objection to Pippin was based not on its ideas but on its
"explicit sexual overtones," Judge Rosenn saw no danger of "ideologi-
cal indoctrination," and thus no First Amendment problem.345
339. Id, at 216 (quoting district court decision, Seyfried, 512 F. Supp. 235, 238-39 (D.
Del. 1981)).
340. l at 216.
341. Compare Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Board of Education, 610 F. Supp. 577, 579 (S.D.
Ohio 1985), which enjoined a school board from halting production of an elementary
school play, where the activity was extracurricular, and the board's vote "was prompted by
its disagreement with" the play's ideas. Cf. Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939, 943
(D. Vt. 1986) (reaching opposite result because there was no evidence of viewpoint dis-
crimination; school authorities have power to censor vulgarity or sexual content); see also
Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1366-67 (D. Or. 1976) (finding ban on "political"
speakers was content-based, in violation of Equal Protection principles, and was applied in
viewpoint-discriminatory fashion, in violation of First Amendment); DiBona v. Matthews,
220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, cert denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990) (reversing summary judgment for
college administrators; material facts regarding motive for cancelling play were at issue);
McCarthy v. Fletcher, 207 Cal. App. 3d 130, 139-47 (1989) (reversing dismissal of challenge
to removal of novels Grendel and 100 Years of Solitude from school curriculum; removal
would be unconstitutional if viewpoint-based).
342. Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 217 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
343. Id. at 219.
344. 111 at 220, 219.
345. Id. at 220. See also Pratt v. Independent School District No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th
Cir. 1982), which applied the same viewpoint neutrality standard, but reached an opposite
conclusion from Seyfried with respect to the removal of a film version of Shirley Jackson's
short story The Lottery from high school and junior high literature courses. Evidence
showed that "[o]pponents of 'The Lottery' focused primarily on the purported religious
and ideological impact of the films," that "the objections of the board's majority had 'reli-
Fall 19961
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
This judicial deference with a relatively narrow exception for
"ideological indoctrination" represented the general state of affairs
when Pico arrived at the Supreme Court. The facts in Pico were typi-
cal of school censorship scenarios: the school board had removed ten
books from its high school and junior high libraries on the grounds
that they were "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just
plain filthy."346 A district court dismissed the students' First Amend-
ment challenge but the Second Circuit reversed, ruling that genuine
issues of material fact regarding the board's motives remained for
trial.347 The Supreme Court affirmed, with four of the five justices in
the majority addressing the merits of the viewpoint discrimination
issue.348
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, after acknowledging the
"broad discretion" of school boards "in the management of school af-
fairs,' 349 articulated the First Amendment limits: school boards and
administrators may not exercise their discretion "in a narrowly parti-
san or political manner" because "[o]ur Constitution does not permit
the official suppression of ideas. '350 Thus, "[ilf petitioners intended by
their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which
petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in peti-
tioners' decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in
violation of the Constitution." 351
gious overtones' and that the films had been eliminated because of their 'ideological con-
tent."' Id. at 776-77.
346. Board of Educ. v Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 857 (1982).
347. See Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404,415-19 (2d Cir. 1980), affid, 457 U.S. 853
(1982).
348. See Pico, 457 U.S. 853.
349. Id at 863.
350. Id at 870-71.
351. Id. at 871 (footnote omitted). Brennan said such viewpoint suppression would
amount to the "officially prescribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned in Barnette," see
supra text accompanying notes 1-2,28, but Brennan seemed to assume that "an unconstitu-
tional motivation would not be demonstrated if it were shown that petitioners had decided
to remove those books at issue because the books were pervasively vulgar." Pico, 457 U.S.
at 871; see supra text accompanying notes 165-66. Justice Blackmun, concurring, agreed
with the Brennan plurality on the crucial importance of motivation in school as in other
censorship cases: "[O]ur precedents command the conclusion that the State may not act to
deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or
political reasons." Pico, 457 U.S. at 878-79. Justice White concurred because he thought
there were disputed issues of fact regarding the "reason or reasons underlying the...
removal of the books"; reaching the First Amendment issues was not necessary, he said,
because after trial the district court might find that the books were "removed for their
vulgarity, [and] there may be no appeal." Id. at 883. The necessary implication is that at
least some reasons (but not including vulgarity) would be unconstitutional.
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Although the four dissenters in Pico bitterly contested the major-
ity decision, three of them did not dispute that at some point, view-
point neutrality standards would apply to school library decisions.
Justice Rehnquist "cheerfully concede[d]":
If a Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, or-
dered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republi-
cans, few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional
rights of the students .... The same conclusion would surely
apply if an all-white school board, motivated by racial animus,
decided to remove all books authored by blacks or advocating
racial equality and integration.352
Rehnquist's dissent was based on his perception that "[i]n this case the
facts taken most favorably to respondents suggest that nothing of this
sort happened. '353 He read the record to indicate that the books were
removed for profanity and vulgarity, not because of their political
ideas.354
Thus, the various opinions in Pico differed more about the state
of the record and the scope of the concept of viewpoint discrimination
than about the proposition that the First Amendment proscription
against suppressing disfavored ideas does indeed apply to public
schools. Evidently Justice Rehnquist thought that the removal of
books because of perceived anti-Americanism or animosity to particu-
lar religious or racial groups would not be viewpoint-based, but that
removal of all books favoring a particular political party or with par-
ticular ideas about racial politics would be. It is difficult to discern
what principle underlies this distinction, unless it be simply a desire to
limit federal court intervention in school matters to only the most ex-
treme scenarios.355
352. Pico, 457 U.S. at 907 (Rehnquist, Powell, and Burger, JJ., dissenting) (referring to
examples given in majority opinion at 870-71).
353. Id
354. See id.
355. See, e.g., id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (warning that the plurality's standard
would bring Court "perilously close to becoming a 'super censor' of school board library
decisions"; question is whether "local schools are to be administered by elected school
boards, or by federal judges and teenage pupils"). Post-Pico cases have maintained the
distinction between illegitimate indoctrination and "educational suitability" as enunciated
by the Pico plurality. See Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir.
1995) (rejecting school board's argument that Pico had no binding effect and should be
disregarded, but not reaching question of whether board members' professed fears that
students might endanger themselves by imitating "hexes" described in censored book
about voodoo traditions was essentially viewpoint discrimination). The district court in
Campbell had ruled that removing the book because of fear of imitation amounted to sup-
pression of dangerous ideas. See also Delcarpio v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 865 F.
Supp. 350,361 (E.D. La. 1994); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 895 F. Supp. 1463, 1468-
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Pico left unclear precisely how to draw the line between unconsti-
tutional suppression of ideas and legitimate "educational suitability"
concerns, especially given the plurality's favorable treatment of
Ambach v. Norwick.3 5 6 Ambach upheld the State of New York's re-
quirement of citizen status for public school teachers, partially on the
theory that citizens are more likely than aliens to teach students patri-
otism and respect for American institutions. 57 The Ambach Court
described public schools glowingly as "vehicles for 'inculcating funda-
mental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system.' ' 358 Ambach thus hardly suggests that viewpoint neutrality is
necessary or even desirable in the sphere of public education. As
Chief Justice Burger wrote in his Pico dissent:
How are "fundamental values" to be inculcated except by hav-
ing school boards make content-based decisions about the ap-
propriateness of retaining materials in the school library and
curriculum[?] In order to fulfill its function, an elected school
board must express its views on the subjects which are taught to
its students.359
The tension between the Court's recognition in both Ambach and
Pico of the important inculcative nature of public education on the
one hand, and of the constitutional dangers of allowing school officials
to impose a "pall of orthodoxy" and suppress "dangerous ideas" on
the other hand, may aptly be dubbed the "Pico paradox. '360 This ten-
sion is heightened where library censorship is at issue, since-as the
Pico plurality pointed out-a library is uniquely a place where "'a
student can literally explore the unknown, and discover areas of inter-
est and thought not covered by the prescribed curriculum.' '361 A li-
69 (D. Kan. 1995) (rejecting argument to disregard Pico; removal of gay-themed novel
because of opposition to the views it expressed would be unconstitutional). After trial, the
court in Case found a First Amendment violation because the school board members had
removed the book based on their strongly held views that homosexuality was evil, sick, and
sinful; see 908 F. Supp. 864, 870-71, 875 (D. Kan. 1995).
356. 441 U.S. 68 (1979), cited in Pico, 457 U.S. at 864.
357. See id
358. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77).
359. Id at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77). Justice Bur-
ger uses "content" and "views" interchangeably in this passage, but the context makes
clear that it is viewpoint bias, at least in the sense of "inculcation of values," that he is
defending.
360. Professor Stanley Ingber describes it less charitably as "judicial schizophrenia."
Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the 'Pall of Orthodoxy': Value Training in
the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 47.
361. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868-69 (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm.,
454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978)).
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brary is less a forum for "inculcation of values" than a repository of
ideas where "the regime of voluntary inquiry... holds sway. '362
The Supreme Court's post-Pico school censorship decisions,
Bethel School District v. Fraser3 63 and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,364 do little to resolve the Pico paradox. Fraser, which up-
held the discipline of a student who used sexual innuendo at a school
assembly, sanctimoniously invoked school boards' power to teach
youngsters "the shared values of a civilized social order. ' 36 5  The
Court did, however, emphasize that the case would have been differ-
ent if the school had punished Fraser for his "political viewpoint. '36 6
Hazelwood gave school authorities broad power to censor stu-
dent speech in curriculum-related, school-sponsored activities as long
as their decisions were based on "legitimate pedagogical concerns. '367
Such concerns included the authorities' desire to avoid association of
the school with "any position other than neutrality on matters of polit-
ical controversy. '368 Neither case suggested that a desire to suppress
disfavored ideas would constitute a "legitimate pedagogical concern,"
even in the curriculum context, and indeed Fraser suggested the oppo-
site.369 Courts both before and after Hazelwood have applied the
Pico principle-that ideologically inspired suppression of particular
viewpoints is not educationally legitimate-to the school library, the
classroom, and extracurricular activities.37 °
362. Id. at 864, 869.
363. 478 U.S. 675 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
364. 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
365. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
366. kL at 685.
367. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. The concerns that led to censorship of the student
newspaper in Hazelwood were legitimate, according to the Court, because they involved
the privacy of female students who had been interviewed for an article on teenage preg-
nancy, as well as parents who had not had an opportunity to respond to an article on
divorce. The articles also had "references to sexual activity and birth control" that might
be "inappropriate for some of the younger students." Id. at 263.
368. Id. How this language in Hazelwood squares with the Court's recognition in
League of Women Voters and Consolidated Edison, see supra text accompanying notes 90-
99, of the extraordinary importance of protecting controversial political speech is not clear,
especially since public school classrooms are "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,"' Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), and students are not simply "closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate," Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
369. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
370. See Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1118 (3d Cir. 1992) (interpreting Hazelwood as
holding that "reasonable, non-viewpoint-based restrictions were acceptable") (emphasis
added); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that Hazelwood did
not eliminate the requirement of viewpoint neutrality); McCarthy v. Fletcher, 207 Cal.
App. 3d 130, 145-47 (1989) (stating that under Hazelwood, curriculum decisions "cannot be
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Can the Pico paradox be resolved? Judge Newman in his Second
Circuit Pico concurrence offered one possible resolution: "It is one
thing to teach, to urge the correctness of a point of view. But it is
quite another to take any action that condemns an idea, that places it
beyond the pale of free discussion and scrutiny." '371 The First Amend-
ment "condemns 'indoctrination' in the sense of endeavoring to insist
that one set of values must be accepted by the students. '372
Under this view, there is a distinction between the "inculcation of
values" through curriculum and library choices and "indoctrination,"
which includes not only decisions to remove or ban materials with par-
ticular ideas, but also instruction imposed in so wooden a fashion that
virtually no room is left for independent thought.373 School boards
and administrators in this scenario thus have the authority to choose
texts and syllabi that generally reflect their political and social values,
but they cannot seek to purge the classroom, or a fortiori the library,
of all opposing ideas or conversations.
Johnson v. Stuart exemplifies this distinction.374 In Johnson, the
plaintiffs chose not to challenge a curriculum guideline requiring that
texts "stress the services of those who achieved our national indepen-
dence. '3 75 Instead, they concentrated their fire on a portion of the
motivated by an intent to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion"') (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); see also Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding
that students had standing to challenge ideological curriculum guidelines); Pratt v. In-
dependent Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1982); Zykan v. Warsaw Community
Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (7th Cir. 1980); Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535,
538, 544 (10th Cir. 1979).
371. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 432-33 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853
(1982) (footnote omitted) (Newman, J., concurring).
372. Id. at 433 n.1 (quoting James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972));
see also Gregory A. Clarick, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting
the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 719 (1990) ("[T]he allowed value inculcation
occurs partly when teachers present competing viewpoints in the classroom.... Although
the Ambach Court did not explicitly name the 'civic virtues' which it regarded 'all teachers
having the obligation to promote,' appreciation and toleration of diverse viewpoints lie at
their core."); Ingber, supra note 360, at 82-93 (suggesting structural remedies as a means of
resolving tension between legitimate inculcation of values and illegitimate suppression of
ideas).
373. As Judge Kennedy of the Sixth Circuit observed, government has a compelling
interest in teaching students "how to think critically about complex and controversial sub-
jects and to develop their own ideas and make judgments about these subjects." Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting parents' free
exercise challenge to curricular materials), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (Kennedy J.,
concurring).
374. 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983).
375. Id. at 194.
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state education law that banned any text that "speaks slightingly of
the founders of the republic."376 Although the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion concerned only standing,377 it implicitly assumed that the plain-
tiffs had stated a viable viewpoint discrimination claim.378
Ideological manipulation of the educational process not only
threatens intellectual and academic freedom but contradicts the fun-
damental purpose of education: the "'wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas"' on which the "'Nation's future depends."' 379
Thus, despite the element of government speech present in curriculum
decisions, public schools are a critical forum for the exchange of ideas,
the nurturing of the human intellect, and the development of thinking
citizens capable of making democratic choices. There are few if any
aspects of American life where viewpoint neutrality principles are
more crucial.
376. Id.
377. The district court in Johnson had dismissed all plaintiffs for lack of standing and
ripeness; the Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the teachers, 702 F.2d at 195, but ruled that
students did have standing based on their right of "free access to information in the contin-
uing process of their education," id at 197. On remand in Johnson, the district court en-
joined the State Board of Education and Textbook Commission from enforcing the portion
of the statute banning books that "belittle or undervalue" the republic's founders, because
the law "acts to contract the available field of knowledge and casts a pall of orthodoxy over
the curriculum." Johnson v. Stuart, Civ. No. 78-770 (D. Ore. 1984) (transcript of proceed-
ings before Judge James M. Bums, July 21, 1984, at 4).
378. Despite the result in Johnson, ideologically driven state and local public education
guidelines proliferate. In 1994, the Lake County, Florida school district not only forbade
teachers to say anything critical of the United States, it mandated instruction on the superi-
ority of U.S. society to any other. See PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, ArrACKS ON
THE FREEDOM TO LEARN 73 (1993-1994 Report). The local teachers' association filed suit,
but an election that year shifted the balance of power on the school board, the guidelines
were rescinded, and the case consequently dropped. Telephone Interview with Gail Mur-
ray, Lake County Education Association, Oct. 14, 1995.
In August 1995, the Merrimack, New Hampshire school board voted to prohibit "any
program or activity that has either the purpose or effect of encouraging or supporting ho-
mosexuality as a positive lifestyle alternative." Walker v. Merrimack Sch. Dist., No. C-96-
87-SD (D.N.H. filed Feb. 15, 1996). "Program or activity" included "instructional materi-
als, instruction, counseling, or other services on school grounds, or referral of a pupil to an
organization that affirms a homosexual lifestyle." Id. In February 1996, a coalition of civil
liberties and gay rights groups, with the Merrimack Teachers' Association, filed suit on
behalf of parents, students, and teachers, challenging the policy on First Amendment and
vagueness grounds. Id. As in Lake County, an election later that year led to rescission of
the policy, and the suit was dismissed.
379. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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Conclusion
Viewpoint neutrality is perhaps the single most important value
underlying the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has ruled, it
governs the constitutionality not only of criminal laws and other direct
forms of government regulation of speech, but also the provision of
government subsidies and other benefits, including access to public
and nonpublic fora for citizens' expression. It even applies to some
government speech, particularly where the government is speaking in
its role as educator: setting school curriculum, choosing library books,
and selecting instructors for public schools and universities.
Defining viewpoint discrimination, however, is not simple. Some
courts that have wrestled with the problem have ignored the forest for
the trees, refining the relevant inquiry so narrowly that the essentially
ideological and repressive function of the restriction in question is ig-
nored.380 Other courts have looked beyond government officials' as-
serted reasons for suppression, discerning viewpoint bias where it may
not appear on the surface of an articulated policy.381 In a critical pas-
sage in Rosenberger,3  the Supreme Court recognized that discrimi-
nation against speech because of its religious perspective is viewpoint-
based because public discussion is "complex and multifaceted," and
silencing whole categories of ideas "skew[s] the debate in multiple
ways. ' 3 3 This insight applies fully to "controversial," "offensive," and
"political" speech which, as the Court has sometimes appeared to rec-
ognize, are essentially viewpoint-based categories. 8 4 It certainly
weakens the too-literal, bipolar construction of viewpoint neutrality
that some courts have employed without taking into account the First
Amendment value in a multifaceted exchange of ideas.
Terms like "controversial," "political," or "offensive" are cultur-
ally and ideologically constructed; what speech falls inside or outside
such categories is almost always defined according to the values and
attitudes of the decisionmaker3 5 The Supreme Court's failure to rec-
380. See supra text accompanying notes 221-44, 258-61; see, e.g., Ethredge v. Hail, 56
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1995); Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (E.D.N.C.
1993), aff'd without opinion, 28 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994); Lebron v. National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 2537 (1996).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 262-280; see, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. v. Mas-
sachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 42 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Department
of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995).
382. See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
383. 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
384. See supra Part I.C.
385. See Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d
760, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (excluding "political" speech operates to screen out controversial
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ognize this point in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund38 6 produced a dubious result that permitted officials to
exclude viewpoints that they perceived as "controversial" from an im-
portant government benefit. Likewise, in the context of public
schools, avoidance of "controversy" is inconsistent with the very pur-
pose of education, which is "to foster.., habits of open-mindedness
and critical inquiry. '387 Thus, the Supreme Court's approval in Hazel-
wood388 of the exclusion of "controversial" articles from a school-
sponsored student newspaper was profoundly antithetical to free
speech values even if, as the Court ruled, school officials plainly may
exercise significant control over publications produced as part of the
curriculum.
Finally, the courts must recognize that discrimination against al-
leged "obscenity" or "indecency" (i.e., against the sexual content of
speech) is fundamentally viewpoint-based. 389 This is surely the most
difficult and controversial proposition put forward in this Article, sim-
ply because the notion that sex is not an appropriate subject matter
for public discussion and display is so deeply ingrained in our society.
But until speech about sex, like other "controversial" or "offensive"
expression, is relieved of its second-class constitutional status, view-
point neutrality in government decisionmaking will remain an unful-
filled promise.
but not bland messages); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 511 (9th Cir. 1988)
(excluding "political" or "controversial" subject matter restricts public debate); AIDS Ac-
tion Comm., 42 F.3d at 12 (using ban on sexually graphic ads to censor controversial but
not conventional sexual ideas); Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1159 (noting that views labelled
"political" are usually those that challenge the status quo); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F.
Supp. 1358, 1366 n.11 (1976) ("[T]he word 'political' itself connotes different things to dif-
ferent people .... ").
386. 473 U.S. 788 (1985); see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
387. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 186 (1952); see also Ingber, supra note 360, at
24 ("An education which respects autonomy-a liberal education-would expose students
to controversy ....").
388. 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 172-73, 364-68.
389. See supra Part II.
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